International Associaton for Presocratic Studies

9th Biennial Conference
22-26 June 2026
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

Book of abstracts

Under the auspices of the Embassy of Greece in Spain

Embajada de Grecia en España

Universidad Complutense Madrid

Facultad de Filología

Universidad Complutense Madrid
Facultad de Filosofía

Departamento de Filología Clásica

Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Facultad de Filosofía
Departamento de Filosofía y Sociedad

IUCCRR Instituto Universitario de Ciencias de las Religiones

SECR Sociedad Española de Ciencias de las Religiones

Sociedad Ibérica de Filosofía Griega

9TH BIENNIAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR PRESOCRATIC STUDIES. 22-26 JUNE, 2026. UNIVERSIDAD COMPLUTENSE DE MADRID

BOOK OF ABSTRACTS. INDEX OF SPEAKERS

AGUIRRE DE LA LUZ, NAZYHELI

The Peripatetic outlook on Democritus' theory of perception

Starting from the well-known passage in which Aristotle (*Metaph*., IV 5) attributes to some Presocratic thinkers an epistemological relativism due to the lack of distinction between sense perception (αἴσθησις) and thought (φρόνησις), this paper undertakes to discuss in particular the criticism against Democritus' view, which the Stagirite depicts as an extreme relativism holding true knowledge as unattainable. Attention will be paid also to Theophrastus' *De Sensibus*, where a contradiction is pointed out between Democritus postulating that perceptibles cannot be defined by their own nature, insofar as they are perceptual affections, over against this thinker's own explanation elsewhere of the objects of reality as so many particular atomic compounds.

We will attempt to show that the objections raised by both Peripatetic philosophers can be refuted by a careful examination of Democritus' fragments (including testimonia) on perception and perceptibles. Firstly, based on an analysis of the list of works by Democritus allegedly compiled by Thrasyllus (D.L., IX 45-49), as well as of the testimonies by Sextus Empiricus (*Math*., VII 138 = DK 68B 11) and Galen (*de experientia medica* ed. Walzer 15, 7, 7 = DK 68B 125), it will be shown that the thinker from Abdera distinguished between sense perception and intellection. Then, some passages from Theophrastus' report (*Sens*., §§ 60-68) on Democritus' theory of perceptibles will be examined, as well as Aristotle's relevant testimonies (*Metaph*., I 985b4–19 and VIII 1042b11–15), in order to show that Democritus held perceptible qualities to be a sort of epiphenomena arising from the collected features of the underlying atoms, which could be variously apprehended by the perceivers, being each individual a perceptible entity with a particular atomic constitution. Finally, we will argue that Democritus' system could scarcely have been termed relativistic, since the affections caused by perceptibles in different individuals —being the several members of each animal species constituted by similar atomic configurations— would also be grasped by sense perception in a very similar way.

ALBANO, NICOLÒ

Il falso Museo. Per un' interpretazione dell' Orakelfälschung di Onomacrito (Hdt VII 6, 2-5).

Erodoto narra di come il cresmologo Onomacrito fu cacciato da Atene per volontà di Ippiarco perché sorpreso da Laso di Ermione ad inserire fra le profezie di Museo una predizione relativa all'inabissamento di alcune isole vicine a Lemno (Hdt VII 6, 2-5). Nella storia degli studi l'episodio della falsificazione degli oracoli musaici da parte di Onomacrito e della sua cacciata dalla città è stato oggetto di diverse interpretazioni. In questo contributo si intende riflettere sull'ipotesi secondo cui Onomacrito, aderendo ad un' opposizione organizzata contro i tiranni di Atene, avrebbe interpolato gli oracoli nel tentativo di scoraggiare la popolazione ateniese rispetto a un progetto di conquista nel Nord-Est dell'Egeo promosso dagli eredi di Pisistrato (J. H. Oliver, *The Athenian*

Expounders of the Sacred and Ancestral Law, Baltimore, 1950 p. 7; R. Flacelière, *Devins et oracles grecs,* Paris, p. 85 ss. and more recently E. D'Agostino, *Onomacriti testimonia et fragmenta,* p.39).

Il contributo si articola in tre parti. Nella prima, dopo un rapido inquadramento della figura di Onomacrito e del ruolo dei cresmologi nelle corti tiranniche di età arcaica (*in primis* Atene e Samo), ci si sofferma sul legame di alcune figure della filosofia presocratica - Lico di Pandione, Museo, Anfilito, lo stesso Onomacrito - col mondo della mantica e della divinazione oracolare. Nella seconda si analizza il testo di Erodoto e si fornisce una possibile ricostruzione degli eventi. Nella terza parte si discute più dettagliatamente l'ipotesi di una partecipazione di Onomacrito all'opposizione anti-tirannica. Uno spazio particolare è dedicato in questa sede al problema degli interessi strategici dei tiranni nello scacchiere dell'Egeo settentrionale (Sigeo, Chersoneso, Tracia).

Gli scopi del contributo sono due: da un lato fornire un'interpretazione convincente dell'episodio dell' Orakelfälschung e dell'allontanamento di Onomacrito, dall'altro cercare di fornire una visione il più completa possibile della figura del cresmologo. In questo senso il contributo fa propria una duplice prospettiva: una storico- filosofica, Onomacrito come sapiente, cresmologos e mantis (Colli, *La sapienza greca*, II) e una storico-politica, Onomacrito come personaggio di spicco della corte tirannica ateniese. Il lavoro, inoltre, mira a contestualizzare l'operato del cresmologo nell'Atene pisistratica a partire dai più moderni studi condotti sugli oracoli greci e sull'oracolarità nella cultura greca antica.

ALEKNIENĖ, TATJANA

Plato, *Phaedo* 95e–101e: A Turning Point from Presocratic Physics to Socratic Ethics

In *Phaedo* 95e–101e, Socrates, addressing his companions concerned about the fate of his soul, recounts his intellectual autobiography. This narrative partly confirms the image of Socrates as a natural philosopher in Aristophanes' *Clouds*, since he admits that in his youth he was devoted to the study of nature, seeking to discover why things are best as they are. Regardless of its historical accuracy, Plato's text marks a shift from physical explanation to a teleology and ethics grounded in the concept of the good. Socrates' decision not to escape from prison was determined not by his bodily constitution but by an inner commitment to the good — an ethical choice. His autobiographical account thus stands as a philosophical manifesto affirming the primacy of ethics.

Socrates' story also resonates with the doxographical tradition, according to which his teacher and the last *physikos* was Archelaus, while Socrates himself "discovered ethics". Archelaus' teaching on the origins of life mirrors the question raised by the young Socrates: whether life could arise when heat and cold act upon decaying matter (96b). No fifth-century BCE sources confirm this connection; hence it has been suggested that the link was a Peripatetic construct marking the transition from physics to ethics — the "last physicist" and the "first ethicist." This biographical pairing helped to personify a key turning point in the history of philosophy.

That the intellectual biography presented in *Phaedo* could have influenced the doxographical tradition is further suggested by the writings of Philo of Alexandria. In his interpretation of Abraham's journey from Chaldea to Canaan, Philo draws on the themes and imagery of Plato's *Phaedo*, using them to frame his association of the Chaldeans with the domain of physics and Abraham's stop at Haran with the ethics discovered by Socrates and the affirmation of reason's superiority over the senses.

ALEVIZOS, KONSTANTINOS

(IT.) Necessità contro predeterminismo nel libro XXV *sulla natura* di Epicuro

Il movimento degli atomi è dovuto alla necessità. Secondo la teoria atomica, infatti, un atomo, e quindi un corpo, non può non muoversi. Comprendiamo quindi che il problema degli atomisti risiede nel capire dove si muoverà, dal momento che deve necessariamente muoversi. In sostanza, gli atomisti esaminano la causa del movimento che, secondo i primi storicamente, è la necessità. Epicuro, facendo un passo ulteriore, menziona tre cause di movimento: la costituzione originaria, l'esterno e l'apogegennemeno (ciò che è stato nato e scisso/scindendosi). La teoria della trasformazione per punti che presenteremo distingue la necessità automatica dal predeterminismo.

Tutti i movimenti precisi e specifici, quando si verificano, saranno sempre soggetti alla necessità automatica. Ciò significa che, se un corpo si trova in determinate condizioni nel punto A, sarà costretto a modificarsi verso il punto B. Questa trasformazione è necessaria, automatica e predeterminata. Quindi, un corpo segue i cambiamenti da A a B, C, ecc., avendo solo due parametri che possono influenzarne la sua trasformazione: la sua *costituzione iniziale* e *l'esterno*. In un mondo ipotetico senza l'apogegenemeno, si potrebbe parlare di un movimento necessario, automatico e predeterminato.

Secondo Epicuro, l'uomo, possedendo anche la terza causa del movimento data dall'apogegenemeno, non può né fermare il movimento né escludersene, ma può almeno in parte indirizzarlo. Fornendo nuova causa di movimento, può cambiare lo stato del corpo A e modificarlo in A', quindi la necessità di movimento automatico lo porterà non a B, ma a B'. In questo modo, elimina il concetto del predeterminismo il quale secondo lui, rappresenta solamente un gioco di parole.

(EN.) Necessity versus predetermination in book 25 *on nature* by Epicurus

The movement of atoms is necessary. According to atomic theory, an atom—and therefore a body—cannot remain motionless. Therefore, atomists are concerned with where an atom will move, since it must necessarily move. Essentially, atomists examine the cause of motion, which they attribute to necessity. Epicurus takes a step forward by mentioning three causes of motion: the initial constitution, the external environment, and the apogegennemeno (who has been born and separated). As such, the theory of point-based motion that we will present distinguishes between necessity and predetermination.

All precise and specific movements will always be subject to automatic movement based on necessity. For example, if a specific body is found under specific conditions at

point A, it will be forced to move to point B; this transformation is necessary, automatic, and predetermined. Thus, a body undergoes transformations from A to B, C, and so on, due to two factors: its initial constitution and its external environment. In a hypothetical world without the apogegennemeno, we could speak of a, predetermined automatic movement due to necessity.

However, according to Epicurus, human, possessing the third cause of motion, the apogegennemeno, cannot stop or avoid movement, but can guide it, at least in part. By providing new cause of motion, man can essentially change the disposition of body A, modifying it to A'. Thus, the need for movement will not bring body A' to B, but to B'. In this way, it dismisses predetermination without avoiding automatic movement based on necessity

ÁLVAREZ SALAS, OMAR D.

A cognitive approach to the "mind" in Xenophanes and related thinkers

By resorting to the findings of standard cognitive model theory —as put forward by Lakoff (1987) and his associates (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, 1999)— and by supplementing them with newer insights from cognitive and historical linguistics, in this study a contribution to a better understanding of the early Greek concept of 'mind' and of its operating mechanisms and structure is tentatively worked out. This will be done by applying to the word field of νόος / φρήν and derivatives in Xenophanes and in a couple of nearly contemporary Greek thinkers —whose use of νόος / νοεῖν was almost exhaustively researched in the encyclopedic book by Stella 2021— some of the methods developed by that strand of cognitive linguistics which "seeks explanations of linguistic structure and behavior not as if these were distinct from cognition, but as if they arise from, and continue to be a part of, human cognition and experience", Gibbs 2005—, so as to shed some light on conceptual knowledge based on the analysis of systematic patterns of linguistic structure. Among the systematic patterns of the Greek language to which particular attention will be paid, the recurring connection between νόος (and occasionally also φρήν) and sense perception (especially sight and hearing, or their total or partial impairment), as well as the imagery of νόος and its function as a 'journey', a 'tool' or a 'container' will be closely analyzed, insomuch as they point to the early elaboration in Archaic Greek language and thought of a variety of conceptual (and pre-conceptual) structures, such as idealized cognitive models, image schemas, metaphoric mappings, mental spaces, and the like. As a result of this, some new hinting is expected not so much at the general architectural form of Greek thought and language, but at the way the early Presocratics were sharping a linguistic tool capable of aptly conveying the new rationalistic outlook on reality which they inaugurated.

ÁLVAREZ-MALDONADO, LUCAS

The First Greek Plant Physiologist: Empedocles' Botanical Theory

While Empedocles' scientific theories concerning humans and animals have received ample attention, no comprehensive reconstruction has yet been attempted of his account of plant life. Fragments and indirect evidence, however, indicate that he developed in his natural poem a distinctive plant physiology—fully consistent with the principles of his broader physical system, successful in explaining major botanical phenomena, and influential in later Greek thought.

To substantiate these claims, I first situate plants within Empedocles' cosmic cycle. The evidence suggests that they were not mentioned in the phase of Increasing Love and that—contrary to the tendency to conflate them with whole-natured beings and a common reading of *Placita* V 26—they are distinctive mortal compounds belonging to an advanced stage of Increasing Strife, that is, the present zoogony.

Secondly, I draw on the testimonies of Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Plutarch to reconstruct Empedocles' conception of plant functioning. A central but often overlooked idea is that he attributed to plants a vascular system: the earth nourishes and stabilises their roots, while fire absorbed from the environment draws moisture upward through inner channels of varying size. When this moisture reaches the aerial parts, it is transformed into leaves and, when compressed by the plant's internal fire—augmented in spring—produces fruit. Through this model, Empedocles offered a rational and coherent explanation of the vital functions of plants—nutrition, growth, budding, fruiting, and death—and could also account for individual differences in size, fertility, and leaf formation. Hypotheses concerning Empedocles' recognition of plant cognition or respiration are, in my view, insufficiently supported and irrelevant to his account of plant phenomena and their differences.

Finally, I argue that Empedocles' plant theories do not derive from those of Menestor but rather the reverse, making him—*pace* Capelle—probably the first Greek plant physiologist. His views also shaped the botanical doctrines of Hippo, Cleidemus, Democritus, and, through the latter, the Hippocratic authors. Empedocles' ideas on plant 'bisexual' reproduction likewise exerted a significant influence on Aristotle.

AUDIÉ, PRUDENCE

Plutarch's Dionysian Empedocles

By reconstructing Plutarch's interpretation of Empedocles' poetic writing, I would like to explore a possible connection between Empedoclean poetry and the Dionysian mysteries.

Εὖ μάλα βεβακχευμένη[ν], "carried away by Bacchic delusions". What does this expression, which Plutarch puts into the mouth of his character Gallaxidoros to describe the philosophy of Empedocles and Pythagoras, mean? With the verb βακχεύω, then synonymous with μαίνομαι, Plutarch summarises the various criticisms levelled at Empedocles' poetic writing, which he seeks to counter: the verb could just as easily refer

to Cicero's remarks denouncing the madness of the Agrigentine as to Aristotle's comments lamenting the lack of clarity in his style.

Unlike his character, Plutarch highlights the rigour of Empedocles' writing. Based on a study of fragments 9 and 44 DK, I will show how Plutarch discreetly reveals the role of syllepsis in Empedocles' writing: just as he showed that images should not be read as mere metaphors, but expressed the very structure of reality, Plutarch invites us to grasp the kinship of beings in Empedocles' poetry.

The Agrigentine's writing is therefore far from being "Bacchic". However, based on Plutarch's reading, can we conceive of another relationship between Empedocles' poetic writing and the "Dionysian" phenomenon?

Plutarch emphasises in *De esu carnium* (996 b-c) that Empedocles' demonology, in its understanding of guilt, refers to the myth of Dionysus Zagreus. This provides an interesting clue for reading Empedocles: Empedocles' poetry functions like the myth that "speaks in riddles" (αἰνίσσομαι). Plutarch thus draws the reader's attention to the dual dimension of Empedoclean poetic writing: on the one hand, Empedocles sticks to appearances and images have the value of truth; on the other hand, 'enigmatic' writing says something other than what it seems to say and refers back to mysteries.

BARES PARTAL, JUAN DE DIOS – NAVARRO GONZÁLEZ, ÁNGELA

Heráclito y la tradición del enigma

Heraclitus' thinking is described as "enigmatic" by the ancients themselves. Following in the footsteps of researchers such as G. Colli and A. Berra, we would like to delve into the religious and sapiential roots of this "obscurity", which we perceive as more than a merely a stylistic feature.

The enigma is common in religious traditions: it appears in the multiple faces of Dionysus; or in the prophetic ambivalence of the Pythia. Enigma is common in religious traditions: it appears in the multiple faces of Dionysus; or in the prophetic ambivalence of the Pythia. We would like to show how Heraclitus borrows this mode of expression from religious experience for his philosophical reflection.

Religious connotations resonate in him, and with this survives a line of transmission of oral knowledge that may have run parallel to the knowledge, transmitted by epic and lyric poetry.

The religious use of riddles coexisted in sixth-century BC Greece with a more mundane use. At banquets the use of riddles and japes was common, as repositories of a popular wisdom that has not been entirely forgotten. Riddles were often formulated by women or female figures, even children, capable of challenging Homer himself.

We will therefore attempt to link the Heraclitean style with the tradition of the seven sages. This opens a fruitful access route to his thinking, allowing us to draw parallels with his contemporaries, such as Cleobulina, daughter of Cleobulus of Lindos. Cleobulina's riddles nourish from presenting the obvious through surprising and unusual terms. This way they could act as a hinge between this lesser-known wisdom tradition and its secularisation and bifurcation between a philosophical resource, a "sophia" (Heraclitus) or a mere symposial entertainment (Cleobulina).

BERGAMO, MAX

Heraclitus, Homer, and the Lice: A Reassessment of Fragment 22 B56 DK (with Additional Greek and Syriac Evidence)

Fragment B56 Diels-Kranz is one of the many pronouncements of Heraclitus whose interpretation is arduous. It features Homer being made the object of derision by a group of youngsters and revolves around a riddle: "What we have seen and caught, we leave behind; what we have neither seen nor caught, we carry with us" – whose solution is: lice. Yet, the riddle is most probably intended as having a deeper meaning, perhaps playing with the name of the lice (φθεῖρες) and the act of destroying or killing (φθείρω). The version of the fragment normally printed in the editions of Heraclitus, and stemming from pseudo-Hippolytus' *Refutatio* (IX 9.5), is however not the only ancient source in which we read this riddle. The editions do not systematically take into account parallel versions, for the following reason: these versions are mainly found in Late Antique lives of Homer, and do not mention the name of Heraclitus.

So, the tacit consensus of scholarship seems to have been to assume that the Homeric anecdote, often developed further by portraying Homer dying of grief at his failed answer, was already circulating at the time of Heraclitus, even though our sources are quite late. While this is possible and seems compatible with the fact that Heraclitus makes a peculiar and philosophically suggestive use of the story, it seems necessary to me to more closely compare the text of our sources to evaluate the possibility that the version of the riddle reported there, if not the anecdote itself, derives from Heraclitus' book. In order to do so, I shall also point to sources that are still neglected in scholarship (both with reference to Heraclitus and to Homer), such as the scholia of the pseudo-Nonnus to Gregory of Nazianzus' fourth homily. The text of this work is extant not only in the Greek, but in two partially diverging Syriac versions, too, which constitute a precious testimony to the diffusion of the – Heraclitean? – anecdote about Homer and the lice in the Late Antique period.

BERNABÉ, ALBERTO

Truth, Opinions and the Path of What Is. Conceptual Clarifications in Parmenides

The aim of this paper is to examine how certain sets of concepts associated with different forms of knowledge and the possibility of accessing them are articulated in Parmenides' poem, expressed both by the poetic voice narrating the proem and by the goddess, presented in three different settings:

1) references to the path travelled by the κοῦρος, put into his mouth in the prologue (B1.1-20), focusing only on the features that refer directly to the realm of metaphors of knowledge.

2) The 'programme' of revelation that the goddess proposes to the kouros, expressed in two types of content: truth and opinions. (B 1.28-30)

3) The only two paths of inquiry that, according to the goddess, can be conceived.

A couple of central ideas will be emphasised.

a) The difference between referring to ways (1 and 3) and types of content.

b) In the study of each of these aspects, we will observe how the philosopher presents the notions associated with each of these contrasts in such a way that they form conceptual implications and networks in which each term—by association or contrast—complements and clarifies the others, thus constituting solid and nuanced sets.

I believe that this perspective, combined with existing ones, can enrich our understanding of the system proposed by the philosopher.

BERRUECOS FRANK, BERNARDO

Eleatism outside the "Eleatic school".
The Reception of Parmenides' Poem in Archaic Choral Poetry

The existence of an alleged Eleatic school in the first stage of the history of Greek philosophy is a widely discussed issue in scholarship. The historical legitimacy of considering Xenophanes as "the initiator of the Eleatic clan" (Plat. *Soph*. 242c-d; Arist. *Met*. 986b21-23) and the extent of Parmenides' legacy in Zeno and Melissus have raised debates and discussions. The present paper aims to present some cases of reception of Parmenides' poetry and thought outside the traditionally recognised members of the Eleatic school. The choral poetry of Pindar, Simonides, and Bacchylides represent cases that help to challenge the very concept of Eleatism as a historiographical category by expanding its boundaries beyond pre-Socratic philosophy itself. What were the routes of transmission that Parmenides' Poem could have followed from the specific performative context in which it must have been originally communicated to its fully textualized existence that allowed it to become a "classic" of pre-Platonic philosophy? Did exist a reception of Parmenides' Poem that exceeded the disciplinary limits of what is usually called "philosophy"? It is undeniable that it is only after Plato that Parmenides becomes an unequivocal part, and as a distinguished member, of the canon of philosophers. This process of *a posteriori* canonization forces us to think about everything that the process of canonization itself renders invisible. Among these dark areas are not only all those specimens that did not enjoy the status of canonical, but also the other possible canons to which certain individual specimens could have been ascribed but which in the end were not. This is precisely what happens with the case of Parmenides, a text that from Plato onwards became philosophically canonized in a definitive way, but which completely lost the legitimate ties that linked it to other possible canons = epic poetry or, more broadly, poetry in general. My focus will be exclusively on Late-Archaic and Classical choral poetry and on three cases of the choral poets of this period: Simonides, Pindar, and Bacchylides.

BEVACQUA, FLAVIO

A Prattler of Stupidities": A First Assessment of Democritus(?) on Cosmic Sympathy (68 B300 DK)

The aim of this paper is to initiate a reassessment of the vast corpus of literature on cosmic sympathy and related subjects (natural philosophy, medicine, and *Gebrauchsliteratur*) attributed to Democritus. This attribution is unquestionably ancient, as evidenced by the catalogue of Democritus' works preserved by Diogenes Laertius (9.48–49), which includes numerous titles unlikely to originate from the Abderite himself, or the *Oration to the Greeks* by the 2nd-century theologian Tatian the Syrian (16.17 = 68 B300.10 DK), who famously defined Democritus as a "prattler of stupidities" (ἀβδηρολόγος, employing an obvious wordplay) because of it. Moreover, certain ancient sources, such as Columella (*Agric.* 7.5.17 = 68 B300.3 DK), mention one Bolos of Mendes, who purportedly authored works under Democritus' name—although his precise role remains unclear.

To commence this reassessment, I shall focus on a severely understudied short treatise attributed to Democritus, entitled *On Sympathies and Antipathies* (Περὶ συμπαθειῶν καὶ ἀντιπαθειῶν), preserved in a small number of Byzantine manuscripts. I shall argue that this text is probably a Byzantine epitome of a treatise widely circulated in Antiquity, originated from the milieu referenced by Tatian or Columella. The treatise, before enumerating sympathetic remedies based on a holistic vision of the universe, offers in its proem a theoretical reflection on the mechanisms of cosmic sympathy, which can be associated with Stoic and Orphic cosmological views. This can further be linked to various medical fragments attributed to the philosopher and to his role within Greek alchemical literature, all of which exhibit shared features. Through this analysis, we can begin to reconstruct a common context for seemingly disparate notices, nonetheless believed since antiquity to have originated from Democritus himself. These notices contributed substantially—perhaps as much as his original doctrine—to the genesis of the myth of *primus omnium Democritus*, a notion that persisted well into modern times.

BRÉMOND, MATHILDE

Catalogues of opinions: the Sophistic heritage

This paper examines the structure of sophistic doxographies and their impact on the reconstruction of the history of philosophy. While the role of Hippias' *Synagogè* as a source for later doxographies, particularly in Plato's and Aristotle's works, has long been acknowledged, Gorgias' influence has often been underestimated, although the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *On Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias* provides valuable evidence of his doxographical practice.

My presentation seeks to distinguish the respective approaches of these two sophists, by nuancing the usual opposition between Hippias as a historian of related ideas and Gorgias of opposed ones; this will allow for a more accurate evaluation of their impact.

Hippias' vision of the history of philosophy can be characterised as encyclopaedic, focused on individuals situated within a genealogy of thinkers holding similar ideas, although he also highlights the conflicts between philosophers. By contrast, Gorgias' method can be described as systematic: he constructs schemes of opposite ideas, without regard for their individual proponents; this leads to a tendency to ascribe to an entire group not only the same theses, but also the same arguments. Finally, I will show how these two approaches are reflected in the doxographies of Plato and Aristotle, and emphasise that Gorgias' method of presenting a philosophical debate was far more influential than is usually recognised.

CASTELLI, ARIANNA

Light, Night, and Memory: Understanding Parmenidean Cognition

This paper investigates Parmenides' conception of memory and offers a new account of the relation between human thinking and perceiving (TP) and memory and forgetting (MF). Although no extant fragment explicitly mentions memory, Theophrastus in *De Sensibus* 4—after quoting B16—states that Parmenides explained TP as well as MF through the *krasis* of Light/Hot and Night/Cold. Following Laks (1990) and Bredlow (2011), I take these remarks to reflect a lost section of the poem.

Two considerations make such a reconstruction plausible. First, the archaic scope of *noos* (B.4,1, and B.16, 2), as Calvo (1977) shows, includes imagination, memory, and the representation of what is absent. Second, both Plato (*Phd*. 96b3–8) and Aristotle (*GC* II 334a10–15) mention memory when discussing Parmenides' physiological account of cognition. However, while Theophrastus correctly attributes to Parmenides a unified physiological mechanism, this does not entail either a strict identification of TP and MF or a strong dependence of MF on TP. *Krasis* explains TP—which are equated with each other—and MF arises from the same mixture; this asymmetry rules out identification. Dependence explains only the precondition of MF—that TP must occur—not its cognitive function.

I argue that memory cannot be reduced to physiology alone. Its emergence depends on krasis, but its function is better explained through the dichotomy Light/Night, which concerns the active exercise of thought. This clarifies the internal architecture of Parmenidean cognition. Finally, this account helps explain how a human being—composed of Light and Night—can embark on the path toward knowledge of Being, which is pure Light. Memory enables correct opinions about the physical world and the proper epistemic assessment of such cognition, distinguishing them from the Truth, of which memory preserves a faint trace.

CHATURVEDI, ADITI

Resituating Heraclitean *Harmoniē*

Maria Michela Sassi (2015) has argued, quite persuasively, that we ought not underestimate the musical aspects of Heraclitean *harmoniē*, and that it should be understood in contrast to the

mathematical *harmonia* found in Philolaus or the non-musical (although I'd dispute this) *harmonia* found in Empedocles. I agree that Kirk (1954) and Snyder (1984), inter alia, may have placed undue weight on the mechanical aspects of *harmoniē*, but, I argue, Sassi risks overcorrecting. While I accept her "density" hermeneutics, after Kahn (1979), according to which key Heraclitean terms must be read through their full semantic range, her account raises the musical register to explanatory primacy without offering a principled method for adjudicating amongst the other registers that Heraclitus deliberately invokes. Our point of divergence is that I disagree that the musical register should be treated as a privileged explanatory framework for our interpretation of Heraclitean *harmoniē*.

I defend my claims through a close reading of fragments B8, B10, and B51, claiming that even though they clearly *allow* for a musical reading, they do not *demand* it. I then situate these fragments within the cosmological doctrines that can be inferred from the wider corpus in order to show that not privileging the musical reading yields a more coherent account of Heraclitean thought. The fifth century is precisely the period during which the term is deployed across domains — crafts, mathematics, ethics, cosmology, and poetics — by Heraclitus' near contemporaries. By reading Heraclitus alongside Pindar and the Hippocratic Corpus (which Sassi treats only through the musical register, invoking *Vict.* while not discussing the mathematical *harmoniē* of *Septim.*), I argue that his usage is not radically discontinuous with his intellectual environment. I also contest Sassi's claim that the of mathematical connotations of *harmoniē* were alien to Heraclitus by discussing fragments that show nascent mathematical notions and arguing that the *harmoniē* fragments must not be read in isolation from them. I agree with Sassi that Heraclitus' theory is original and creative, but disagree about the features that make it so.

Works Cited

Kahn, Charles H., *The Art and Thought of Heraclitus*. Cambridge University Press, 1979

Kirk, Geoffrey Stephen, *Heraclitus: The cosmic fragments*. Cambridge University Press, 1954.

Sassi, Maria Michela. "How musical was Heraclitus' Harmony? A reassessment of 22 B 8, 10, 51 DK." *Rhizomata* 3, no. 1 (2015): 3-25.

Snyder, Jane Macintosh, "The Harmonia of Bow and Lyre in Heraclitus Fr. 51 (DK)" *Phronesis*, 29(1) (1984), 91–95.

CORDERO, NÉSTOR-LUIS

Une faute tragique: de la δόξα chez Parménide à la δόξα de Parménide / A tragic mistake: from δόξα in Parmenides to Parmenides' δόξα

Dans trois occasions les passages récupérés du *Poème* de Parménide font allusion aux "δόξαι". Elles exposent une διακόσμησις qui s'appuie sur deux "principes" opposés, et elle appartient aux "mortels": "Il faut que tu apprennes tout […], et les opinions *des mortels,* d'où toute vrai conviction est absente" (fr. 1.28-30). "À partir d'ici, apprends les opinions *des mortels* (δόξας [...] βροτείας, fr. 8.51)". "Ainsi son nées ces choses selon l'opinion (δόξαν, fr. 19.1) […]. Pour chacune *les hommes* (ἄνθρωποι) ont établi un nom distinctif" (fr. 19.3). Or, quand Aristote commente le sujet, la référence aux "autres" disparaît et celui qui propose deux principes contraires devient Parménide lui-même: "*Il*

[= Parménide] *revient* à deux causes et à deux principes qu'*il nomme* chaud et froid […]. De ces causes, *il range* le chaud du côté de l'être, et l'autre du côté du non-être" (*Met.* A.5.986b27); "*il pose* l'existence non seulement d'une cause mais en quelque sorte de deux" (A.5.984b2)*;* etc. Cette image qui fait de Parménide un φυσιόλογος comme les autres se trouve par la suite dans tous les doxographes héritiers d'Aristote, notamment chez Simplicius, qui, conscient cependant de la faute d'Aristote (car il ne s'agit pas d'une interprétation erronée, mais d'une faute), écrit ce passage étonnant: "Comment Parménide, considérait-il qui existaient seulement les choses sensibles (τὰ αἰσθητά), lui, qui a philosophé sur l'intelligible (τοῦ νοητοῦ) […] Comment a-t-il adapté aux choses sensibles ce qui est propre aux intelligibles, lui qui a transmis séparément l'union de ce qui est, qui est réellement et qui est intelligible, et, séparément l'ordonnance (διακόσμησιν) des choses sensibles" (*De Cael.* 558.12). Voilà la réponse: les δόξαι sont présentes *chez* Parménide, mais elles ne sont pas *de* lui.

A tragic mistake: from δόξα in Parmenides to Parmenides' δόξα

On three occasions, the recovered passages from Parmenides' *Poem* refer to “δόξαι.” The Goddess says that the δόξαι exposes a διακόσμησις based on two opposing ‘principles’ and are specific to “mortals": “You must learn [...], the opinions of mortals, from which all true conviction is absent” (fr. 1.28-30). “From here, learn the opinions of mortals (δόξας [...] βροτείας, fr. 8.51)”. “These things are born according to opinion (δόξαν, fr. 19.1) [...]. For each, men (ἄνθρωποι) have established a distinctive name” (fr. 19.3). However, when Aristotle comments this subject, the reference to “others” disappears and who proposes the two opposing principles *becomes Parmenides himself*: "He [= Parmenides] returns to two causes and two principles, which he calls hot and cold [...]. Of these causes, he places heat on the side of being, and the other on the side of non-being“ (*Met*. A.5.986b27); ”he posits the existence not only of one cause but, in a sense, of two" (A.5.984b2). “He asserts that being and non-being are fire and earth” (*De Gen*. 318b6); etc. This comment, which makes Parmenides a φυσιόλογος like the others, is subsequently found in all the doxographers who inherited Aristotle's ideas, notably in Simplicius, who, however, aware of Aristotle's mistake (for it is not a matter of misinterpretation, but an error), writes this astonishing passage: "How did Parmenides, who philosophized about the intelligible (τοῦ νοητοῦ), consider that only sensible things (τὰ αἰσθητά) existed [...] How did he adapt to sensible things what is proper to intelligible things, he who transmitted separately the union of what is, what really is, and what is intelligible, and, separately, the order (διακόσμησιν) of sensible things" (*De Cael*. 558.12). Here is the answer: the δόξαι *are present* in Parmenides, but they are not *of him.*

COSTA, ALEXANDRE

Parmenides, theory of names

Starting from the analysis of all the occurrences of the term onoma and other cognate words that are present in Parmenides’ poem, I propose that his philosophy formulated

a theory of names and that this theory clarifies how and why the Parmenidean work is dedicated in a decisive way to the thematization and description of the opinions of mortals as a philosophical problem of the first magnitude, affirming its unavoidability and its necessary character, and that for being anchored in the inevitability of naming as a human reality and in the signifying action that it exerts. From its intimate correlation with the opinions, the names emerge in this horizon as equivalent to what we usually designate as current verbal *language*, the natural utterance with which we communicate and express our impressions of the world, ultimately making evident that the description of the opinions, as exposed in his poem, consolidates an effective theory of language in general, and that by means of the theorization of names, of naming and of signs (*semata*) articulated by them, through which all things are named, signalized and "full" (*pleon*, DK 28 B9, 3) of meaning. Apart from all this, the being (*eon*) and the truth (*aletheia*) remain as realities that are contrasting and incompatible with the name and the opinions (*doxai*), thus remaining as a perfect opposition to the *diakosmos* of the very language of mortal opinions, and demanding of us, for this reason, the radical replacement of the questionabout what "being" and "truth" effectively are in the conceptual reality of the poem of Parmenides.

CRESPO SAUMELL, JORDI

What Did You Watch: Everything Is Illuminated or The Man with the Ray Eyes?

The aim of this communication is to gain an appreciation of the different ways by which the visual perception was explained in Antiquity, and consequently, to provide arguments for an emanationist account of the physical world.

On the one hand, in *On Divination in Sleep*, Aristotle is puzzled at the fact that some people can foresee the future in dreams. In order to give a rational interpretation of this phenomenon, Aristotle makes reference to a theory of the emanations, which the Stagirite attributes to Democritus. The point is that while seeking a definition of the color, in the *Meno* Socrates had put this very theory of the emanations to Empedocles. Therefore, the analysis will be firstly oriented to spot the hints of such a theory in the fragments of the Presocratic philosophers Democritus and Empedocles, by bearing in mind that both authorities made their respective hypotheses to relie on the premise of an "intromissive theory of the vision" in virtue of which it is deemed that sight is brought about by means of the emanations which, arising from the objects, travel through the air to end up affecting the eye of the perceptor.

However, and on the other hand, the analyses above would only provide a partial solution to the problem. From some passages assigned to Parmenides, we learn that the Eleatic physiologist would have held an "extromissive theory of the vision" according to which from the eyes of the subject of perception a beam of light — a subtle emanation — would be projected towards the objects. Thereby, to fully grasp the matter, since it will have to play a part in the explanations of the sight perception by the Stoic Chrysippus and by the physician Galen, the complementary Parmenidean approach to the issue will also be taken into account.

DEGUTIS, MYKOLAS

Bridging the Gap Between Gods and Humans: Pherecydes' Nuptial Myth and Epimenides' Divine Origins of Society

In archaic Greece, conceptions of the gods varied from polis to polis. No coherent theological system yet existed, and religious understanding was predominantly shaped by local cult practice. This paper analyses how two early thinkers (Pherecydes and Epimenides) endeavour to respond to this theological fragmentation by articulating models in which the human and the divine domains are conceptually integrated into a unified cosmic framework. Pherecydes' nuptial myth of Ge and Zas establishes a basis for both cosmology and societal structure within one narrative: through divine union, a habitable earth is born when Chtonie becomes Ge. This transformation signifies not merely a cosmic event, but also the nuptial ritual of ἀνακαλυπτήρια as a paradigm for both divine and human society. In Pherecydes' account, the actions of the gods do not merely create the world but establish civic customs that are imitated in historical time. Though little is known of Epimenides' theological views, a relatively overlooked passage in Diodorus Siculus (5.64-80) may be read as reflecting his doctrine. The text conceptually concludes the mythological period of Diodorus' universal history by offering a euhemeristic explanation of the birthplace of the gods (Crete) and their contributions to humanity, which range from metallurgy and music to, most significantly, social order. Although Epimenides' explanation appears proto-euhemeristic, it is not as reductionist in its approach to divinity as that of some later euhemeristic authors. Unlike mortals, as Callimachus reports in his quotation of Epimenides (Callim. *Hymn* 1.8-9), the gods do not die. Thus, for Epimenides, contemporary institutions are conceived as divine gifts, and the political ideal of a golden age justice is located not in utopia but in a real sacred past. Together, these thinkers exemplify early efforts to structure religion not solely as a set of localised cult practices but as an encompassing framework of cosmic and human order.

DI MAIO, CHIARA

Anchoring Sophistic thought in the Greek tradition: Anaxagoras, Empedocles, Democritus and their Athenian followers

This paper anchors the philosophical tradition represented by the Athenian Sophists in the one of three (slightly) preceding Greek thinkers: Empedocles, Democritus and Anaxagoras. The argument of a strong continuity within the Greek philosophical tradition throughout the whole fifth century BCE is supported from a twofold perspective.

In the first section, connections between theoretical positions of Empedocles, Democritus and Anaxagoras and those represented by the Athenian Sophistic movement are highlighted. The analysis of relevant fragments displays how themes such as materialism, atheism and rhetoricism are observable in Empedocles, Democritus and Anaxagoras already, as well as the insistence on some mathematical problems, such as squaring the circle.

In the second one, the analysis of ancient testimonia is used as medium to show that such continuity was already perceived by the ancient tradition. The anchoring of their teaching to an older phaenomenon was, on the one hand, operated by the Sophists themselves, in order to construct a more traditional image. Furthermore, it was appreciated by Plato (whom, in *Resp.* 343b introduces as *oi sophoi* Empedocles, Protagoras and Anaxagoras). As a result, some explicit links needed to be made observable by doxographic constructions: to make just one example, Empedocles is said by Diogenes Laertius to have been Gorgias' master.
Such continuity is a noteworthy and often neglected phaenomenon in the history of Greek thought. Highlighting it can provide with new tools to understand the traditionality of some pre-Platonic threads of thought.

D'IPPOLITO, ARMANDO FRANCESCO

Perì Puròs kaì Phōtós: Evidence for the Presence and Evolution of a Physics of Light from the Presocratics to Plato

Most contemporary literature on ancient Greek optics, and in general histories of optics dedicating some space to ancient Greek optical theories, agree that the Greeks—from the Presocratics to Plato, Aristotle, and even some of the pioneers of scientific optics such as Euclid and Ptolemy—had no interest in light as a physical entity worthy of scientific analysis. As is well documented in the classical sources, the Greeks had a strong interest in the mechanism of vision. For most scholars, this would be the only kind of investigation conducted by ancient Greek optics, with no attention paid to what light itself is. For this reason, the passage from ancient to modern optics, which is on the contrary focused on the task of accounting for the nature of light, has traditionally been labelled as a shift of interest from sight to light.

Even scholars specialising in what the Presocratics thought about light conclude that, putting aside the question about how the image of light was used as a metaphor in the service of religious, poetic, and philosophical purposes—which is on the contrary unanimously seen, and rightly so, as a fertile terrain—little else is said about light (*phôs*) other than that it is fire (*pûr*). This is commonly believed to be the case for Plato as well, whose interest in light, when not metaphorical, would have to be considered only passing and subordinated to the task of accounting for the role that light plays in the mechanism of vision.

In this paper, I argue that there is evidence that ancient Greek optics paid attention not only to the mechanism of vision but also to light, and moreover, that this was done not in full subordination to the task of explaining the role that light plays in visual sensation, but out of scientific curiosity about the nature of light. In particular, I focus on some major Presocratics and Plato, hence I show that, alongside the shift from the former's general talk of light as fire to the latter's explanations—especially from the *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Timaeus*—of the precise kind of fire with which light has to be identified, there is evidence of the presence and evolution of a proper physics of light. Sporadically, and mostly over the past few years, a minority of ancient philosophy scholars and historians of optics have pointed in this direction. I recover and further develop this literature by proposing an original systematic and comparative analysis of

the evidence in our possession, with the aim of contributing to the redefinition of our understanding of ancient Greek optics as containing both a theory of vision and a physics of light.

DUQUE, MATEO

Still Is Still Moving to Me": Parmenidean Being, the Block universe, and McTaggart's B-Series

This paper brings Parmenides into conversation with contemporary physics and analytic metaphysics by exploring structural parallels between his conception of *being* and modern four-dimensional accounts of spacetime. When Parmenides describes being as "whole and of a single kind and unshaken and perfect…since it is now, all together, one, continuous" (B8.4–5), he anticipates a picture strikingly reminiscent of the block universe of contemporary physics. According to this view, the past, present, and future all coexist within a single, fixed spacetime totality. In analytic metaphysics, four-dimensional perdurantism similarly rejects the idea of persisting three-dimensional substances in favor of temporally extended "space-time worms." The block universe generalizes this idea to the cosmos as a whole: every entity is a segment or slice of a larger four-dimensional structure. This framework also aligns with McTaggart's B-series theory of time, which orders events by the unchanging relations *earlier than* and *later than*, rather than by the shifting distinctions of past, present, and future that characterize the A-series. McTaggart's argument for the "unreality of time" challenges ordinary temporal intuitions in much the same way the block universe challenges commonsense views of change and becoming. I argue that Parmenides' depiction of a single, continuous, and changeless reality—"changeless within the limits of great bonds" (B8.26)—resembles these contemporary metaphysical and physical models more than is typically recognized. By placing Parmenides alongside the block universe and the B-series, we can illuminate both the ancient roots and the philosophical implications of contemporary four-dimensional ontologies.

ESQUIVEL ESQUIVEL, JUAN CARLOS

Aenesidemus on Heraclitus

Several passages in Sextus Empiricus and Tertullian attribute to the skeptic Aenesidemus of Cnossus the appropriation of certain theses associated with Heraclitus' philosophy — or with a particular interpretation of it. This claim has long generated debate among scholars of ancient skepticism, since it appears to suggest a reconciliation of two contradictory stances (i.e., skepticism and dogmatism).

The interpretative difficulty is further complicated by the fact that Sextus Empiricus—our most substantial source on Pyrrhonism—not only explicitly states that Aenesidemus agrees with Heraclitus (Αἰνησίδημος καθ' Ἡράκλειτον), but also reports

that he regarded skepticism as a path (ὁδός) toward Heraclitus' philosophy. Yet, from Sextus' own skeptical standpoint, the Heracliteans cannot be considered genuine skeptics. According to him, while the latter say that "the same thing is the subject of opposite appearances," the former "go on from this to affirm the reality of opposites."

This paper examines the relationship between Aenesidemus and Heraclitus through a philosophical and doxographical analysis of the relevant passages in Heraclitus, Sextus Empiricus, and Tertullian. Its aim is to identify whether any conceptual elements of Heraclitus' thought may have been appropriated by Aenesidemus. I follow and develop Roberto Polito's suggestion, arguing that it should not be assumed that Aenesidemus maintained Heraclitus as an authoritative guide for skeptics, nor that he adopted any form of Heracliteanism *in propria persona*. While following Polito, I focus mainly on the fragments of Heraclitus, Sextus Empiricus, and Tertullian to show that Aenesidemus may have held that skepticism could serve as a means toward a better understanding of Heraclitus' philosophy. Thus, this analysis seeks to clarify how Heraclitus was interpreted within Aenesidemus' skepticism.

FELDMAN, SARAH

Semonides Fragment 1 and the "Negative" Solution to Epistemic Limits

This paper argues that Semonides 1 (7th century BCE) represents an early pattern of some of the basic problems and strategies of pre-Platonic epistemology. Specifically, it uses the sustained evocation of human epistemic limits to mitigate those limits. On the surface, the poem offers a familiar lesson about both the difficulty and the prudence of training one's attention on the constraints of mortality. It focuses, specifically, on the chasm between, on the one hand, the god who "holds the end of all things and puts it wherever he wants" and, on the other hand, humans who delude themselves about that end. However, the poem puts pressure on those limits in some surprising ways. The first 23 verses present the human propensity for delusion in such emphatically global terms as to make ignorance of mortal constraints inherent to the constraints themselves. Yet the poem ends on an accusation. The audience is actively responsible for their state, which they might escape if they heeded Semonides – who has, however, given no advice, but simply described their condition.

I argue that these peculiarities are part of the poem's framing of and solution to an epistemic problem remediable neither via the accumulation of life experience nor through the learning of a body of wise sayings. In place of the latter, the poem uses an unrelenting catalogue of miseries that go hand-in-hand with our character as mortals to attack that hopeful oblivion that arises from the same source. In other words, he uses the distilled experience of the various constraints of mortality to mitigate their usual epistemic corollaries. In doing so, he offers a pattern for later thinkers – notably Heraclitus – for whom the process of attaining knowledge seems mediated at least as much by repeated experience of one's epistemic failings as by any positively-stated wisdom.

FERELLA, CHIARA

What—or Who—is Anaximander's Apeiron? Rethinking the Infinite as a Primordial Deity

Anaximander of Miletus is credited with introducing the concept of the infinite (τὸ ἄπειρον) into Western philosophy—an intricate notion that has long resisted comprehensive explanation. Traditionally, Anaximander's *apeiron* has been understood as a boundless material expanse, an inexhaustible material reservoir akin to a primordial mixture, or a finite mass deemed "unlimited" because it is spherical. Challenging this standard view—and building on recent proposals that interpret *apeiros* as an attribute signalling a more dynamic and qualitative dimension—this paper re-examines the key sources to argue that Anaximander's unlimited *archē* is not simply a vast, material, and passive substrate governed by mechanistic motion. Rather, it is a generative, self-sustaining, and vital entity: an expression of divine and purposive agency that actively shapes, sustains, and regulates the cosmos.

Seen in this light, Anaximander's *apeiron* can no longer be reduced to a purely spatial, material, or quantitative principle; instead, its deeper theological and ontological significance comes into sharper focus. In place of an impersonal, passive expanse, the *apeiron* begins to resemble the nature and agency of a primordial god. This raises a fundamental question: what if Anaximander's *apeiron* was not merely a *what* but, in a meaningful sense, a *who*?

To address this question, the paper advances a bold proposal: that Anaximander's *apeiron* is a god that, while likely remaining anonymous, is nonetheless best understood against the background of the primeval divine figure of Time. While it is widely accepted that the *apeiron* possesses a temporal dimension, I argue that our sources reveal deeper affinities between its properties and the divine figure of Time—reconstructed through both Greek and non-Greek traditions. This connection reinforces the idea that Anaximander's *archē* was a wilful and self-regulating divine agency, which differs substantially from the capricious gods of the Homeric and Hesiodic tradition in that it operates as an ordering force, steering and embracing all things in a regular, law-like manner.

By reinterpreting Anaximander's *apeiron* in this way, the paper offers a fresh perspective on one of the most enigmatic concepts at the dawn of Greek philosophy.

FERRO, FRANCESCO

DK 28B1.2: the ὁδὸς πολύφημος as the Path of the Groundbreaking Announcement

The meaning of the adjective πολύφημος, which in DK 28B1.2 qualifies the ὁδός on which the poet metaphorically travels, is a thorny issue in Parmenidean scholarship. Many scholars interpret the term as 'renowned'. Others, however, argue that it refers either to the numerous stories that can be heard along the road, or to the numerous contents of knowledge that, from a Parmenidean perspective, are found along it. By clarifying the Parmenidean context and literary background – especially the epic one – and through a meticulous analysis of occurrences of the adjective and the noun φήμη in

authors prior to or slightly later than Parmenides, I aim to show the inadequacy and insufficiency of the interpretations proposed so far, and to propose a fresh, more effective and comprehensive, reading of πολύφημος. In line with the proem's role in the epic genre, which Parmenides chooses to expound his doctrine, he seeks, in the proem, to condense the theoretical and spiritual import of the the poem as a whole. In this – in accordance with one of the semantic possibilities of the noun φήμη, and understanding the prefix πολυ- also, and above all, in a qualitative sense – there is an announcement of the utmost efficacy and importance that disrupts the status quo, altering the existential perspective of those who receive it: the Parmenidean doctrine regarding the structure of the cosmos will shake the person who receives it to their core, separating them from other mortals and elevating them to the level of divinity, and thus to the level of being and truth.

GIMENES DE CAMPOS, ROGÉRIO

The inclination of the Heavens: Revisiting Oenopides of Chios

The lack of information capable of supporting robust conclusions about his actual contributions to geometry and astronomy makes Oenopides of Chios a little-known thinker (DK 41; Bodnár, 2007). Despite the many uncertainties, our aim is to highlight the privileged context in which he lived, briefly outlining a map of directions in which his thought may be revisited, in relation to some of his contemporaries and to some of his main themes. We will address two different aspects: (i) the discovery of the zodiacal belt and of the Great Year, and (ii) Oenopides' legacy in the development of Eudoxus of Cnidus' models. The issue of the zodiacal belt is documented especially by Proclus (*In Eucl.* 65, Friedlein) and Eudemus (*Theon Smyrn.* 198 = Wehrli fr. 145), and they pose the difficulty of discerning what obliquity was discovered—whether it was a systematization of the zodiacal constellations, a perception of the Milky Way, or a sharper notion of the inclination of the Earth's axis. Aristotle, in his *Meteorology*, gives an insufficient summary of these problems related to the Milky Way and to comets, mentioning the mistakes of Anaxagoras and Democritus (Ar. *Mete.* 345a–b). We will see how the tenuous connection between Oenopides and Eudoxus forms an important and not yet well-established path between the early outlines of these astronomical systematizations and the more complex explanatory models of planetary retrogradations. The study also allows us to observe the subtle links between Oenopides and Anaxagoras, which invite us to perceive and reassess the portrait we have of Anaxagoras as a strictly metaphysical thinker, disregarding his practical activities in the fields of geometry and meteorology.

GREGORY, ANDREW

Parmenides, Sufficient Reason and the Identity of Indiscernibles

The aim of this paper is to investigate the possibility that the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles formed a tacit part of Parmenides' argument in the *Alētheia* part of

his poem. That Parmenides employed something like the principle of sufficient reason can be readily seen in Fr. 8, arguably in many places but perhaps most evidently in Fr. 8, 6-10 on change. The close relation between the principle of sufficient reason and the Identity of Indiscernibles was something made clear by Leibniz.

An argument for there being one thing, and one thing only can be phrased in the following way. If there are supposed to be more than one thing, then those things must have differences, or by the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles they are in fact only one thing. If for every fact there is a sufficient reason and there is no sufficient reason for any differences between the supposed two things, then there are no differences between them, the principle of Identity of Indiscernibles applies and there is only one thing.

It is important here to look at the *Alētheia* on time and space, as these are often treated specially in relation to the Identity of Indiscernibles. It is also interesting in Fr. 4 and Fr. 8 to see how Parmenides suppresses possible differences (no more… no less… no smaller… no larger etc.) to generate one entity.

This work is part of a larger scheme seeing the *Alētheia* as a working out of the consequences of an unlimited application of the principle of sufficient reason while the *Doxa* examines the consequences of limiting its application.

GUERRIERI, MARCO

Investigating the MXG (*On Melissus Xenophanes Gorgias*)

The pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *On Melissus Xenophanes Gorgias* cannot surely be counted among the most popular and well-considered sources in Presocratic philosophy's scholarship. This may be due to the fact that this work presents a number of issues: from the uncertainty of its title to the anonymity of its author, from the peculiarity of some of its arguments to its particularly complex textual transmission. Nevertheless, the *MXG* is a work rich in information and seems to deserve far greater attention than it has so far received in scholarship. In this talk, I would therefore like to address four main points, which are hypothetical but constitute an interesting subject of ongoing research:

1. How far can we go when establishing the authorship of *MXG*?

2. How faithful is this source for the actual studies on Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias?

3. What is the function of this treatise?

4. Most of all, what is the *fil rouge* of the treatise? What is the element that makes the three parts fit together, hence the reason of its philosophical unity?

I will attempt to provide an answer to these questions in order to stimulate a new debate on this captivating, though overlooked, ancient work.

HEINEMANN, GOTTFRIED

Phusis in Early Greek Philosophy

Early Greek Philosophy (EGP) created a field of interest, and genre in writing, which, by the end of the 5th century, came to be known as *peri phuseôs*. Only later, the formula served as a unified book-title. By contrast, insofar as the surviving fragments indicate a general subject matter of inquiry, *panta* was referred to rather than *phusis*. *Meteôra* (etc.) provided the specification required but became illegal in Athens. *Peri phuseôs* (*tôn pragmatôn / hapantôn*) was unobjectionable.

If not the subject matter of inquiry: what is *phusis* in EGP? As a rule, *phusis* is always the *phusis* of something (rare exceptions are not, or not much, earlier than Plato). 20th century scholarship described two different accounts of *phusis*: a *genesis* account (Heidel, Naddaf) and a *dunamis* account (Vlastos). The primary composition account of *phusis* attributed to Empedocles (fr. 8.4 (!)) by Aristotle (Met. Δ 4, 1014b35 ff.) can be understood in both ways, by equating *phusis* either with *ousia* (as does Aristotle) or with origin, as in On ancient medicine (VM) 20.1. The primary composition account of *phusis* there attributed to philosophiê is also a genesis account. For medicine a *dunamis* account is proposed in VM 20.3 which relies exclusively on evidence from medicine. Reductionist *dunamis* accounts derived from primary composition are dismissed (in VM 1 ff.) as unrelated to evidence.

So far, the preliminaries. I will argue that (i) *VM* is essentially right concerning *phusis* in EGP and in professional contexts. (ii) In EGP, attempts to explain regularity by primary composition are noticeable. (iii) Order, by contrast, cannot be so explained. Hence divine steering and creationist accounts of order in EGP. (iv) Both in Plato and Aristotle, *dunamis* accounts of *phusis* prevail which derive from *technê* rather than *philosophia*.

HERRERO DE JÁUREGUI, MIGUEL

Tatian as neos (anti-)Heraclitus

In the so-called second Sophistic it was a typical rhetorical device to choose a classical author as a model for the framing of an authorial identity: Arrian as *neos Xenophon*, Lucian as a new Aristophanes, etc. This authorial strategy may also be spotted in Tatian's *Oratio*—recent research has recognized the large influence of contemporary rhetoric upon the Syrian apologist—taking Heraclitus as model. Indeed, Tatian has sometimes been labelled by modern scholars "a Christian Heraclitus" due to the sententiousness and obscurity of his style, but this intuitive judgement may rest upon a purposeful self-portrait.

Tatian deals directly with Heraclitus in the exordium (*Or*. 3), when he criticizes the Ephesian's arrogance, which ultimately led him to think he could heal himself from dropsy by covering his body with dung, which hardened and caused his death. When he tells his own conversion (*Or*. 29), Tatian clearly alludes through lexical parallels to Heraclitus' short biography: where the Ephesian boasted "ἐμαυτὸν ἐδιδαξάμην" because he was αὐτοδίδακτον, Tatian says "I sought being by myself" (κατ' ἐμαυτὸν γενόμενος ἐζήτουν) because he was "God-taught" (θεοδιδάκτου). Oblique allusions

between both passages accumulate in sufficient degree to see an intention. The allusion to Heraclitus' death through dung solidified (κρατυνθείσης) also explains the otherwise un-understandable following passage (*Or*. 30) where Tatian says that instead of letting the evil seed solidifying (κρατυνθέντος), he aims to cover his soul with the dust that comes from unearthing the hidden treasure. Significantly, Tatian's attitude towards medical doctors (*Or*. 16-17) is akin to Heraclitus' despiteful treatment of medicine (B 58 DK).

Notwithstanding many differences, the clear parallels which Tatian draws with Heraclitus show he took him as classical reference within the rival Greek camp. That perspective opens the possibility of interpreting some other passages in the *Oratio* as allusions to Heraclitus' logos.

HLADKÝ, VOJTĚCH

Francesco Patrizi on Early Greek Philosophy

The paper will present Patrizi's reception of the Presocratics in his monumental *Nova de universis philosophia* (1591).

Following the tradition of Renaissance Platonism, Patrizi (1529–1597) develops the idea of primordial ancient wisdom on an unprecedented scale, assigning a pivotal role to legendary figures such as Zoroaster and Hermes Trismegistus, as well as the Greek sages Orpheus and Pythagoras. Moreover, his account of early Greek thought includes most of the thinkers that are today labelled as Presocratics, on whom the paper will concentrate. However, at the same time, based on the idea of perfect and coherent ancient wisdom, Patrizi offers a distinctive perspective on the development of early Greek philosophy. It differs significantly not only from today's more historical approach but also, for example, from that of his younger contemporary Johannes Kepler, who criticises him while making use of his treatise.

The most important feature of Patrizi's approach to the Presocratics is thus not a progressive development of the Presocratic thought from, roughly speaking, more simple and empirical concepts of the world towards more complex and abstract ones (as e.g. 19th century scholarship would tend to claim). In contrast, the main framework of his interpretation of early Greek thought is the decline and loss of original wisdom, to which all true ancient sages and philosophers contributed in their own peculiar manner. His ambitious project consisted not only of restoring this wisdom in the *Nova de universis philosophia*. It also included preparatory work on an edition of early Greek philosophical texts, which, if realised, would result in a collection of Presocratic fragments predating Diels and Kranz by more than three centuries.

HÖCHSMANN, HYUN

Empedocles, Hölderlin, and Nietzsche – The Metamorphosis of Empedocles from a 'Philosophical Centaur' to a Philosophical Phoenix

When we study Empedocles' *Περὶ Φύσεως* (*On Nature*) and *Καθαρμοί* (*Purifications*) and Hölderlin's *Death of Empedocles* 'under the sun of the great Nietzschean inquiry', Empedocles is transfigured from a 'philosophical centaur' to a *philosophical phoenix*. For his 'prodigious union of Ionian elemental physics and Orphic religion', Empedocles has been lauded as a 'philosophical centaur' by Werner Jaeger.

Empedocles' leap into the fiery crater of mount Aetna, presaged by his annunciation, 'θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐκέτι θνητός' (God of the immortals, no longer mortal) is not an act of inordinate hubris (as implicated in the common view ensuing from Diogenes Laertius' embroidered account). Empedocles' action signifies an affirmation of an unending cyclical process of eternal recurrence: the individual is a temporal instantiation of the four *roots* (ῥιζώματα – air, water, earth, and fire) and two active principles of love (φιλότης) and strife (νεῖκος). Sextus Empiricus' interpretation of Empedocles' endeavours towards an ethical life and the apprehension of the divine from within, invites us to ponder on Empedocles as a luminous precursor of Socrates who recounted that he hearkens to the δαίμων within.

The amplitude of Empedocles' physics and cosmology has reverberated throughout history, igniting vigorous philosophical debate from Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Neo-Platonists, and to the recent centuries. Lucretius notes that Empedocles 'scarcely seems to have been born of human stock'. In light of Plutarch's extensive references to Empedocles the possibility that he wrote a ten volume study of Empedocles is not without some credence. Matthew Arnold and W. B. Yeats have drawn significantly from Empedocles' cosmology.

In Hölderlin's *Death of Empedocles* and in Nietzsche's sketches for a tragedy on Empedocles, Hölderlin and Nietzsche stand with Empedocles' δαίμων in the exploration of philosophical comprehension and poetic language beyond the ontological threshold. An aspiring *ομηρικός*, poet emulating Homer, Empedocles' sustained engagement with Pindar is enhanced by Hölderlin'ss translations of Pindar.

In the conclusive aphorism of *Morgenröthe* (*The Dawn of Day*) Nietzsche, who drew inspiration from 'glorious Hölderlin', presages a horizon of anticipation for the flight of a philosophical phoenix –

> *Wir Luft-Schifffahrer des Geistes!*– Alle diese kühnen Vögel, die in's Weite, Weiteste hinausfliegen, – gewiss!
> (We aeronauts of the spirit! All those brave birds which fly out into the distance, into the farthest distance it is certain!)

ISIDORO GIRÁLDEZ, EMILIO

La interpretación aristotélica de los argumentos de Zenón como paralogismos

Aristóteles abre *Física*, VI 9, donde procederá a exponer y analizar los cuatro «argumentos sobre el movimiento» (λόγοι περὶ κινήσεως) debidos a Zenón que

conservamos principalmente gracias a él, con una afirmación categórica: Ζήνων παραλογίζεται. A su vez, los mismos se engloban en *Tópicos*, VIII 8, en el marco de los «argumentos contrarios a las opiniones» (λόγοι ἐναντίοι ταῖς δόξαις), de suerte que, si identificamos a estos como aquellos argumentos que concluyen un enunciado παράδοχος (en este caso, aquel según el cual «no hay movimiento»), resulta entonces comprensible la tradicional descripción como «paradojas» de eso que Aristóteles designa como «paralogismos».

Por otro lado, si en el primero de los pasajes citados señala Aristóteles que tales argumentos se caracterizan por «poner en aprietos a quienes intentan resolverlos» (παρέχειν τὰς δυσκολίας τοῖς λύουσιν), en el segundo se sugiere que estos serían tan «difíciles de resolver» (χαλεπὸν λύειν) que, aun reconociéndolos como paradójicos, podrían conducir a quien los afrontara dialécticamente a ceder a ellos y a asumirlos así como concluyentes.

Suponiendo que la denominación de los argumentos zenonianos como «paralogismos» por parte de Aristóteles tenga un carácter técnico, esto es, suponiendo que responda a la clasificación de los silogismos por él realizada al inicio de *Tópicos* (donde los παραλογισμοί se definen mediante su deslindamiento frente a los razonamientos científicos, dialécticos y erísticos), estos tendrían tanto interés desde la perspectiva de la física como desde la de la dialéctica. En este sentido, nos proponemos estudiar las paradojas de Zenón, en el contexto en el que se nos han transmitido (la filosofía aristotélica), con vistas tanto a esclarecerlos a partir de una rigurosa comprensión de los mismos en cuanto paralogismos, como a clarificar, tomándolos como ejemplos eximios de la categoría dialéctica en cuestión, la noción aristotélica de «paralogismo».

IULIANO, LORENZO

The Presocratic Philosophers and Ennius: The Emergence of The Latin Air

This paper compares the use of the words ἀήρ and αἰθήρ in the fragments of the Presocratic philosophers with the use of their Latin transliterations *aer* and *aether* in Ennius' works. The presence of philosophical doctrines in Ennius' works has already been recognised by several studies: to name just a few, Dutsch (2014) and Favi (2020) trace pseudo-Pythagorean and Stoic concepts in the *Epicharmus*, while Fabrizi (2020) and Glauthier (2021) suggest that the *Annales* may contain allusions to Pythagorean and Empedoclean doctrines, such as metempsychosis, the four elements, and the cosmic force of Strife. However, I propose that a closer analysis of Ennius' natural vocabulary also reveals the reception of philosophical concepts.

While the meaning of ἀήρ remains quite steady, denoting a kind of dense air, similar to mist, the αἰθήρ of archaic epic, originally a meteorological term denoting the light of a clear sky, evolves into the αἰθήρ of the Presocratic philosophers (especially, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, and Empedocles), who employ the word to designate the fiery, solid sphere of the stars and one of the four basic principles of the universe (alongside fire, water, and earth). Similarly, Ennius distinguishes *aer* from *aether*, using the former to describe a kind of humid air, derived from rain, and the latter to indicate the fiery sky and its bright vault.

Therefore, I suggest that the semantic reconfiguration of the word αἰθήρ,

initiated by the Presocratic philosophers, is reflected in Ennius' use of *aether*. This would not only support the view that Ennius was engaged with philosophical thought, but also offer one of the earliest attestations of the reception of early Greek philosophy in Latin literature.

Dutsch, D. (2014) 'The beginnings: Philosophy in Roman Literature before 155 B.C.', in *The philosophizing muse: The influence of greek philosophy on roman poetry*, eds. D. Konstan and M. Garani. Newcastle: 1-25

Fabrizi, V. (2020) 'History, Philosophy, and the Annals', in *Ennius' Annals, Poetry and History*, eds. C. Damon and J. Farrell. Cambridge and New York: 45-62

Favi, F. (2020) *Epicarmo e pseudo-Epicarmo (frr. 140-197): introduzione, traduzione e commento*. Göttingen

Glauthier, P. (2021) 'Homer «redivivus»?: rethinking the transmigration of the soul in Ennius's Annals', *Arethusa* 54.2: 185-220

JACOB, DAWN

Was Democritus A Eudaimonist?

Among contemporary scholars it has become standard to interpret Democritus' ethics as eudaimonistic, in large part based on doxographic reports that Democritus identified εὐθυμία as the τέλος. This essay resists the eudaimonist interpretation. First, I argue that, despite the doxographical claims, consideration of the fragments provides no compelling reason to read Democritus as a eudaimonist on any meaningful interpretation of eudaimonism. Further, in *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*, we see evidence that Cicero struggled to cleanly fit Democritus' ethics into the eudaimoinst theoretical framework, at one point (5.29.87-88) stating that Democritus took εὐθυμία to be the *summum bonum* and at another (5.8.23) stating that εὐθυμία cannot be considered the *summum bonum*. I explain Cicero's difficulty by positing that Democritus was working within an ethical framework that was a forerunner to eudaimonism—one which took as its central focus a choice between lives. This framework, having no explicit canonical statement, was subject to being flexibly deployed. Thus, we find different versions of it in the extended metaphor attributed to Pythagoras about the types of people who attend a festival, in Prodicus' Choice of Heracles parable, and in Democritus' philosophy. Now, the question, "What life should one choose?" is not unrelated to the question "What is the τέλος?" and we see the latter question emerging as a way of answering the former in Plato and Aristotle. But despite this connection, one can advocate for the choice of a particular sort of life without specifying any τέλος. Interpreting Democritus as working within the choice-of-lives framework allows us to better appreciate how he transcends mere ethical platitudes while also better situating him in the philosophical context that gave rise to eudaimonism.

KEOSEYAN, BENJAMIN

Eunomia and the Decline into Tyranny in Anonymous Iamblichi: A Socratic Precursor to Plato

Recent scholarship on Plato's political philosophy (by e.g., Lane, and Annas) has highlighted the importance of the rule of law in the philosophical projects of both the *Laws* and the *Republic*. These scholars argue that Kallipolis is an ideal city which embodies *eunomia* precisely because in it, the guardians rule by and through law, and the city's eventual degeneration into tyranny is driven in part by the erosion of that legal order. This paper argues that these insights about *eunomia* and the rule of law are anticipated by the Presocratic author of the *Anonymous Iamblichi* (DK 7–8). If, as Horky has argued, the author of *Anonymous Iamblichi* belongs to the circle of Socrates, then he ought to be read as part of a broader intellectual tradition which Plato inherited—encompassing both Xenophon's and Plato's Socrates, among others—that understands *eunomia* in terms of the social stability provided by the rule of law. I argue that *Anonymous Iamblichi* anticipates Plato in articulating (1) that tyranny arises from a progressive decline in *eunomia*, and (2) that *eunomia* itself should be understood as the condition of a polis governed by laws which are widely followed by the citizens. In recovering this neglected strand of the Presocratic tradition, the paper shows that key Platonic political principles have clear antecedents in early Greek philosophy.

KIDD, STEPHEN

Democritus and the Origin of "Self-Evidence" (*to enarges*) in Philosophy

When did the notion of self-evidence – *to enarges* – begin as a philosophical term? Katerina Ierodiakonou argues that it began in the "the epistemological debates of the Hellenistic schools the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Sceptics", while Luc Brisson argues that it was already an epistemologically significant term for Plato.[1] But, in this paper, I will argue that, whenever Plato discusses enargeia in an epistemological context, it is always in response to some pre-existing notion of *enargeia* – and that this notion comes from Democritus.

Socrates often reacts to an apparently established method which begins from "selfevident" premises: "clear" information from the senses, "self-evident" geometrical axioms, and the like. These premises are felt not to require or benefit from further proof (this happens in the *Theaetetus*, *Republic*, and *Phaedrus*). But each time Socrates discusses this method, he procedes to critique it and replace those "self-evident" premises with premises derived from dialectic and proof. Only when they have been found to be true through logic, he claims, do these principles become truly "evident".

[1] Ierodiakonou, K. 2011. "The Notion of Enargeia in Hellenistic Philosophy" in Episteme, etc.: *Essays in Honour of Jonathan Barnes*, B. Morison and K. Ierodiakonou, eds. Oxford: 60-73, at 62; Brisson, L. 1997. "L'intelligible comme source ultime d'évidence chez Platon" in *Dire L'évidence*. C. Lévy and L. Pernot (eds.): 95-111, at 110: "L'évidence est donc la pointe d'épingle sur laquelle se fonde une pensée philosophique comme celle de Platon."

To whom was Plato referring regarding this "evidence"-based epistemology? Democritus is an especially plausible candidate for a number of reasons. He is connected to this word in Galen's *On Ancient Medicine*, and Plutarch's *Table Talk*, in which Favorinus reports Democritus' view of the *enarges* aspect of dreams. This latter passage, with its materialist *eidolon*, resembles a passage from Plato's *Phaedrus*, which Robert Hedrick has argued alludes to Democritus.[2] Finally, the word fits Democritus' epistemology: as Mi-Kyoung Lee sums up Democritus' scientific method, "in order to know what is non-evident, hidden, or unclear, one must begin at the right starting point, namely, a grasp of what is evident."[3]

KOČANDRLE, RADIM

The Influence of Parmenides on Aristotle's conception of spherical Earth

Although the influence of Parmenides's thoughts is usually associated with ontology, we can also trace their impact on cosmology. When Aristotle in *De caelo* introduces his conception of a spherical Earth, he supports it with several arguments. Some are empirical but theoretical considerations seem to play a decisive role. They are based primarily on the theory of natural places, with focus on explaining why heavy bodies fall. It can be argued that in the background of all this reasoning stands the assumption of a sphere of fixed stars towards whose centre move all parts of earthy element, thus gradually forming a spherical Earth. Given that we find the notion of a spherical heaven already in Plato, we should consider the possibility that Aristotle drew on an existing conception of the heavenly sphere and set his physical principles within that framework. Relevant to these considerations is the fact that Plato repeatedly formulated an argument regarding the stable position of the Earth in the centre of a spherical heaven, and that argument is attested already in the thoughts of Parmenides. Moreover, while Diogenes Laertius ascribes to Parmenides a spherical Earth, Parmenides's Being has also been compared to a sphere. It is important to note that, according to Eudemus, some thinkers interpreted Parmenidean Being as the heaven, which may indicate that the conception of the heavenly sphere is based on Parmenides's Being in the cosmological sense of unity of all there is. If, in Aristotle's theory, a spherical heaven indeed formed a precondition for the spherical shape of the Earth, one could thus see it as evidence of the influence of Parmenides's thoughts.

KRAUS, MANFRED

Gorgias, Logos and Hippocratic Medicine

In order to claim for rhetoric the reputable status of a true art, Gorgias seeks to put it on a par with medicine, the most respectable and undisputed art of his time. In the passage on *logos* in his *Encomium of Helen*, to describe the powerful effects of persuasive *logos*,

[2] Hedrick, R. 2020. "Plato on Democritean Films: An Allusion to Atomism in the *Phaedrus*" *Mnemosyne* 75: 427-440.
[3] Lee, M.-K. 2005. *Epistemology after Protagoras*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, at 245.

he employs a fourfold pattern based on the crosswise intersection of two antithetic dichotomies, which is clearly modeled along the lines of the fourfold system of humoral medicine found in treatises of the Hippocratic Corpus, including *On Ancient Medicine*, *On the Nature of Man*, or *On Airs, Waters, and Places*. Since he expressly refers to drugs and humours in that context, the medical parallel appears undeniable.

Gorgias certainly had a medical background in his family, since his brother was a physician, and he was also influenced by Empedocles, who not only had a reputation as a healer and physician, but also used a fourfold system of physical elements in his cosmology.

In contrast to popular views that rather emphasize an influence of Gorgianic rhetoric on Hippocratic treatises, it will be argued that it was Gorgias who adopted an originally medical theory that may have been older than its codification in Hippocratic treatises.

Additional evidence for the fact that Gorgias's description of the power of *logos* was perceived as an adaptation of the quadripartite model of humoral medicine can be seen in Plato's effort in his Gorgias to refute this parallelism of rhetoric and medicine precisely by likewise applying fourfold taxonomies.

LEA, LUKE

What Would Grow from a Buried Bed? Antiphon on *Nomos* and *Phusis*

If one were to bury a bed in the ground and the rotting wood of the bed were to send up a shoot, what is it that would grow? Not a bed, but wood. So at least argued Antiphon in the first book of *On Truth*, to illustrate the relationship of *nomos* to *phusis* (DK 87B15=Aristotle *Physics* 193a9-17). This paper develops a novel interpretation of the thought experiment.

The paper's first section argues that the standard interpretation of Antiphon's buried-bed thought experiment preserves misunderstandings that date back to Aristotle. Whereas Aristotle and his commentators seem to impute to Antiphon the view that the nature (*phusis*) and essence (*ousia*) of a natural thing is its matter (*hylē*) rather than its form, I argue that we should not attribute such a view to Antiphon on the grounds of both anachronism and interpretive charity. The original thought experiment, as the second section argues, was instead meant to demonstrate two points about *nomos* and *phusis*: that *phusis* reveals what things truly are while nomos obscures this; and that the impositions of nomos tend to have a hostile effect on phusis. Finally, the third section relates the buried-bed thought experiment to the ethical passages of *On Truth* preserved on papyrus fragments. I argue here that the buried-bed thought experiment provides a model on which we can understand Antiphon's doctrine of the "hostility" of *nomos* to human *phusis* (DK 87B44A Col.2 23-30; Col 5.13-17); as the arts of the woodcutter and the carpenter work against the natural interests of a living tree or bush by disfiguring it into a human-made artifact (bed), so does *nomos* distort human *phusis* to the disadvantage of those who defer to it gratuitously.

LEBEDEV, ANDREI

The "Orphic" graffiti from Olbia, Pythagorean συστοιχίαι and itinerant *manteis*

In this paper I propose a new reading and interpretation of the so-called 'Orphic' graffiti from Olbia on the base of superior quality photographs of the plates (as compared with 1978 photos in the *editio princeps*), published by Jurij Vinogradov in his Pontische Studien (1997) but for some reason virtually neglected in subsequent scholarship. Relying on this photo, I read and interpret the bottom line of the recto of OF463 as follows: Διο[νύσωι] Ὀρφικῶ[ι] λ̄ , i.e., τριακάδι (scil. θύειν vel εὔχεσθαι) – "Sacrifice (or pray) to Dionysos Orphikos on the thirtieth day". *Dionysos Orphikos* is Dionysos of Orpheus' *Theogony*, the son of Persephone, as distinguished from the traditional Dionysos, the son of Semele, who unlike his Olympian namesake permanently dwells in Hades. The bone plates are neither dedications to Dionysus, nor secret 'tokens' of the initiated members of an Orphic *thiasos*. They are the oldest example of fortune-telling cards (ἀγυρτικοὶ πίνακες), typologically comparable to Tarot cards and Chinese inscriptions on oracular bones (ancestor of the Book of changes), and are based on the principles of Greek cleromancy (astragalomancy), since their triadic structure (number - prophecy – name of the god to whom one should pray) coincides with that of the cleromantic oracles from Asia Minor of the 2nd and 3rd centuries A.D. edited by Nollé. The owner of the plates may have been "Pharnabazos, the diviner of Hermes" (Φαρνάβαζος, θεοπρόπος Ἑρμοῦ), known from another graffito from Olbia of the same period: Hermes was a patron god of dice divination, therefore 'diviner of Hermes' means *astragalomantis*. On paleographical grounds I redate OF463-465 to the late fifth century. The drawings on the plates are connected with the symbolism of the Orphic myth of sparagmos (dismemberment) of Dionysus by the Titans: on the verso of OF464 is pictured a ἱερὰ τράπεζα with seven *astragaloi*, the παίγνια of baby Dionysos in the sparagmos myth. The drawing of unfinished square with diagonals on the verso of plate OF465 with σῶμα ψυχή graffito on the recto, seems to be a graphic illustration of the dictum attributed to Pythagoras ψυχὰ ἀνθρώπου… ἐστὶ τεράγωνον εὐθυγώνιον (Joh.Lyd. *De mens.* 2.9). The four pairs of opposites of opposites derive from a table comparable to the Pythagorean table of 10 opposites arranged in two columns κατὰ συστοιχίας.

Conclusion: the plates provide no evidence on the existence of 'Orphic community' in Olbia, let alone of a kind of 'Orphic church' in Greece, but they provide evidence on the circulation of "Orpheus' Sacred Words" in the Northern Pontic region in late fifth century B.C. Pharnabazos like the wandering priests (*agyrtai*) and diviners (*manteis*) in Plato's *Republic*, carried "books of Orpheus" in his bag, and combined the "Orphic" sparagmos/rebirth myth with Pythagorean doctrine of the substance dualism of the mortal body and immortal soul: the opposites ψυχή σῶμα are correlated with opposites ἀλήθεια ψεῦδος.

How do these conclusions fit into the 200 years long and ongoing debate on the origin and place of "Orphism" in Greek religion and thought between the "maximalists" (to use the term of F. Graf) and sceptics? They sustain a kind of balance. On the one hand they show that Orphic anthropogony existed before Plato (contra Edmonds and sceptics), on the other hand they support the priority of Pythagoreanism in the debate on its relation to "Orphism." The owner of cleromantic πίνακες probably combined the

skills of a fortune-teller and Orpheotelest. He relied on the Pythagorean style συστοιχίαι and peculiarly Pythagorean metaphysical doctrine of the immortality of the soul in his exegesis of the mythopoetic anthropogony of "Orpheus." This goes in line with the opinion of Herodotus and Ion of Chios, namely that the name of Orpheus was a mask which Pythagoras wore to give the authority of antiquity and divine revelation to his doctrine of the afterlife.

Selected bibliography of sources

The 1997 photographs of graffiti and "portrait"of Pharnabazos: Lebedev A.V. The Aegean origin and early history of the Greek doctrines of reincarnation, in: *Myth, Ritual, Literature*, Moscow, 2023, 238-299. Full text: https://www.academia.edu/65120419/. Inset after p. 299.

The Pharnabazos graffito: Belousov A.V., *Defixiones Olbiae Ponticae*, Mosquae, 2020., #20.

Nollé J. *Kleinasiatische Losorakel. Astragal und Alphabetchresmologien der hochkaiserzeitlichen Orakelrenaissance*. München, 2007.

LLORENTE PESCADOR, MANUEL

The Lyrical Tradition of pre-Socratic Ethics: Theognis, Heraclitus, and Parmenides

This paper investigates the poetic precedents of pre-Socratic ethics. In recent years, the modern category of 'pre-Socratic philosophers' has been the subject of numerous criticisms (Lebedev 2010 ; Leszl 2010 ; Most 2010 ; Wardy 2019), questioning the legitimacy of the criteria used to group together the heterogeneous list of authors included in the Diels-Kranz edition *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*.

As is well known, the justification for such a unitary conception of philosophy prior to the appearance of Socrates rests on two ancient traditions, the Socratic-Ciceronian and the Platonic-Aristotelian (Laks 2006). According to the former, the thematic unity underlying the diversity of the pre-Socratic authors is summarised in the phrase περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν (Pl. *Phd*.96a).

However, it is undeniable that many of the authors considered pre-Socratic also reflect on problems relating to human morality (Kaplama 2021). Among the most notable are fragments B45 of Heraclitus and B6 of Parmenides. Although it has often been pointed out that research into nature has poetic antecedents in the great epic tradition of mythical theogonies and cosmogonies found in Homer, Hesiod and, later, in the prose of Pherecydes of Syros or Acusilaus of Argos (Most 2006; Santamaría Álvarez 2021), my aim is to show how texts of ethical inspiration depend, on the contrary, on a tradition close to lyric poetry. In this paper, I propose to analyse the lyrical precedents of the debated pre-Socratic ethics through the elegiac poet Theognis of Megara.

References

Diels, H. - Kranz, W. (1954). *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 7ª ed.

Kaplama, E. (2021). An Introduction to Pre-Socratic Ethics. Cosmos and History. *The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy* 17.

Laks, A. (2006). *The Concept of Presocratic Philosophy. Its Origin, Development, and Significance*. Princeton University Press.

Lebedev, A. V. (2010). "Getting Rid of the Presocratics". In Philosophy in the *Dialogue of Cultures. Materials of the World Philosophy Day*, p. 177 - 183.

Leszl, W. (2010). "Aristoteles on the Unity of Presocratic Philosophy". In *La costruzione del discorso filosofico nell'età dei Presocratici*.

Most, G. W. (2006). "The poetics of early Greek philosophy". In *The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy*. Cambridge University Press, p. 332 - 362.

(2010). "Pólemos pántôn patér. Les Présocratiques dans la recherche des années 1920". *Les études Philosophiques* 93, p. 235 - 253.

Santamaría Álvarez, M. A. (2021). "The Emergence of the World in Early Greek Theogonies from Hesiod to Acusilaus". In *Narrating the Beginnings*. Springer, p. 117 - 137.

LOUREIRO CONTE, BRUNO

Plutarch and Parmenides

Plutarch probably obtained firsthand access to Parmenides' poem. This positions him as a significant source that can illuminate the reception and maybe a fundamental aspect of it, the relationship between *Alêtheia* and *Doxa*.

We will focus on Plutarch's defense of Parmenides in the *Against Colotes*. Central to it is the rebuttal of Colotes' destructivist interpretation (which infers from monism the elimination of all concrete realities), emphasizing that Parmenides "has also described in his poem the arrangement of the world (καὶ διάκοσμον πεποίηται), and after he has mixed the elements, the bright and the dark, he produces all the phenomena out of them and by means of them (ἐκ τούτων τὰ φαινόμενα πάντα καὶ διὰ τούτων ἀποτελεῖ)" (*adv. Colotem*, 1114B6-9 = LM D9, their translation). The passage references Parmenides' B8.60 διάκοσμος, and Plutarch's understanding of it is not isolated. In fact, this reference situates Plutarch within a longstanding tradition — already found in Theophrastus' *Phys. op.* 6 (= LM R13) and traceable to Aristotle's interpretation— that credits Parmenides with an explanatory theory of φαινόμενα grounded in some pair of opposing ἀρχαί. Simplicius, at the very end of this tradition, highlights lines B8.53-61 plus B9.1-4, clarifying the association of this theory with a section of the poem labeled "Against Opinion," Πρὸς δόξαν (see Simpl. *in Phys.*, 179.29-180.13; cf. Proclus, *in Tim.* I, 252. 1-4, etc.).

We will suggest that the final clause in the passage from Plutarch is a paraphrase of B8.31b-32 (with φαίνομενα replacing δοκοῦντα). This explains why Plutarch does not directly cite those verses, even though he soon quotes the other programmatic lines from the prologue (B1.29–30), and B8.4. It is likely that he is recalling the poem "from right to left." Plutarch's argument and its strategy — despite being contaminated by the Platonic dualism — pinpoints the root of Colotes' error in a way that may illuminate our

interpretation of the poem. It may suggest that both Parmenides' argument on being and his cosmology should be understood as complementary elements of a revisionist metaphysics.

LUGANI, GIORGIA

Catching Protagoras: Plato's Pursuit of a Moving Target

Plato's refutation of Protagoras in the *Theaetetus* (152a-183c) is directed not at a single, unified doctrine but at a plurality of interpretations generated by the *homo mensura* thesis. This plurality stems from Plato's deliberate alignment of form and content: the structure of the refutation mirrors the instability implicit in the claim that all perceptions are true because they depend on both the perceiving subject and the ever-changing object. If Protagoras is right, the meaning of his doctrine must shift with each interpreter, and a successful refutation must therefore address all its possible instantiations.

Within the dialogue, Socrates engages four perspectives shaped by the interlocutors: (A) the written Protagoras, reconstructed by Theaetetus from *On Truth*; (B) the apologetic Protagoras defended by Theodorus; (C) the rhetorical Protagoras familiar to philosophical critics; and (D) the esoteric Protagoras linked to theories of radical flux. Each phase of the argument exposes specific tensions: the first (152a-160e) employs eristic pressure, prompting Socrates to recalibrate the critique; the second (161a-168c) introduces a pragmatic Protagoras able to distinguish better from worse perceptions; the third (170a-177c) tests the thesis in ethical and political contexts; and the fourth (179c-183c) confronts the flux doctrine and reveals its self-undermining implications.

Through this multi-layered strategy, Plato not only dismantles Protagoras' epistemology but also raises a broader question about how a philosophical position is constructed and then refuted within the dialogue. The paper examines the methods by which Plato shapes Protagoras' doctrine, multiplies its possible voices, and stages its critique. By attending to these narrative and argumentative choices, the study reflects on the porous boundary between the historical sophist and the dialogical figure who bears his name, and on how the success of the refutation depends on navigating that boundary.

MACÉ, ARNAUD

Potential and actual infinity in the division of bodies from Zeno to the Atomists

In fr. DK B1, Zeno explicitly asserts that dividing a magnitude into smaller parts will never reach an end. This is because no segment will be an extremity; it will always be possible to make another cut. The dichotomy triggers an infinite regress in the sense of a potential infinity. However, later sources suggest that Parmenides (or perhaps Zeno) believed that the dichotomy could be brought to an end by imagining it 'accomplished in every part'; the process would result in a body yielding an infinite number of parts of

no magnitude (see Simplicius relying on Porphyry, in 'On Aristotle's Physics', 139.24–140.6). With this argument, the dichotomy yields an actual infinite. The question is whether we can allow the dichotomy in Zeno to yield both potential and actual infinites. If the latter is ac-cepted, does the argument in B1 still hold if it is no longer true that there can never be a final stage in the process of division (a point made by G. Vlastos in 'A Zenonian Argument Against Plurality', pp. 227–233)? However, Aristotle (Physics, I, 3, 187a1–3; Gener. and Corr., I, 7, 325a5–36) tells us that the Atomists asserted the existence of indivisible magnitudes in order to avoid the conclusion that any plurality of bodies would necessarily be reduced to nothing by division. We will examine division arguments from Zeno to the atomists to determine whether they can be interpreted in terms of potential or actual infinity, also considering mathematicians and sophists. According to DKA29, for instance, Zeno could have debated with Protagoras whether a smaller sound could always corre-spond to the fall of a smaller part of a grain. Or could one conceive of sound being divided so many times that it eventually yields parts with no sound?

MACHÍN, DEYVIS DENIZ

La atribución de la doctrina aire-dios a Diógenes de Apolonia

La comunicación somete a discusión la atribución de la doctrina aire-dios a Diógenes de Apolonia (*c*. *fl*. 431/423 a. C.). La genérica asimilación de esta doctrina con el monismo material y fisiocognitivo que, a la luz de DK64 B5 (Simp., *in Ph*., I 4, 152.22-153.13) es defendido por Diógenes de Apolonia, surge de la confluencia de, al menos, los siguientes factores, a saber: (i) la apretada simplificación doxográfica que inicia con Aristóteles (*Metaph*., 984a5-6) y (ii) la sincrética superposición de planteamientos a primera vista afines, tales como, por ejemplo, el de Arquelao (Aët., I 7 14 [=DK60 A12]). A estos dos factores, propios de la temprana recepción de la filosofía de Diógenes de Apolonia, se aúnan los dos siguientes, los cuales dependen, más bien, del diligente trabajo exegético llevado a cabo por parte de intérpretes y editores de su obra filosófica, a saber: (iii) la reordenación de las *ipsissima uerba* conservadas por Simplicio (*In Ph.*, I 4, 151.20-153.22) y la aceptación, prácticamente unánime, de la emendación sugerida por Hermann Usener en DK64 B5. A la luz de estos cuatro factores condicionantes, se mostrará cómo los testimonios aducidos en favor de la atribución de tal doctrina a Diógenes de Apolonia son tan extremadamente insuficientes como poco comprometidos con reportar de manera fidedigna las doctrinas en que se vertebra su entero planteamiento filosófico, por ejemplo, la de la alteración cualitativa gracias a la cual el aire sabe ser muchas cosas (πολλὰ εἰδός). Ninguno de los testimonios (cuatro griegos y tres latinos), tomados aisladamente o en conjunto con los restantes, resulta, pues, incontrovertible al momento de también poder atribuir a Diógenes de Apolonia ya sea la defensa de un monismo teológico al modo, por ejemplo, como el de Jenófanes (DK B23, 24, 25, 26; cf. Simp., *In Ph*., I 2, 22.30-23.20), ya sea la asunción del denominado *passus theologicus*.

MACRIS, CONSTANTINOS

Pythagoras in Byzantium: Exploring the Anonymous *Life of Pythagoras* preserved in Patriarch Photius' *Myriobiblos*

Among Patriarch Photius' reading notes and summaries preserved in his *Myriobiblos* (*Bibliotheca*), in 9th-century Byzantium, codex 249 contains some pages of notes taken from an anonymous – and undated – *Life of Pythagoras* (*Puthagorou bíos*), which in fact is more doxographical than biographical in content. Differently from Diogenes Laertius' and Porphyry's *Lives of Pythagoras*, and from Iamblichus' *On the Pythagorean Way of Life*, which have been translated, commented upon and studied by many scholars during the last decades, the *Life* transmitted by Photius has been largely neglected. The last (and only) comprehensive study of this extremely interesting and at times intriguing text is more than a century old, and is due to Otto Immisch (*Agatharchidea*, 1919).

The aim of the paper is, first of all, to highlight the most original points made in the text on a wide range of subjects, such as (following the order in Photius) Pythagorean number philosophy, cosmology, causality (God, providence, *heimarmenē*, *prohairesis*, fate), the true sense of 'knowing thyself', the theory of the man-microcosm containing all the *dunameis* of the world, the organs of knowledge, climate determinism, and even the cause of the flooding of the Nile. The study of the doctrines attributed to Pythagoras on these various subjects could offer elements enabling us to raise and answer questions pertaining to the sources, historical contextualization, date and probable authorship of this quite unexplored *Life*.

MALASPINA, IULIA

La verità secondo Parmenide

Che cos'è la verità secondo Parmenide? Il presente contributo cerca di dimostrare che la verità parmenidea, lungi dall'essere un criterio di corrispondenza tra quello che si dice e quello che è, è un modo di vivere, più precisamente l'unico modo razionalmente giustificabile di osservare il mondo nel quale ci troviamo e conseguentemente di capirne l'essenza o, meglio, il cuore, l' ἦτορ. Il contributo prende le mosse da una lettura letterale del frammento B2, da intendere come la descrizione di due percorsi possibili, dei quali uno però va escluso sin da subito, mentre l'altro conduce a considerare tutto ciò che è – ovvero tutto il nostro mondo empirico, inclusi i nostri pensieri e le nostre bugie – in quanto è – ovvero nella sua *condicio*, nella sua condizione di essere, condizione immutabile perché fuori dal tempo e dallo spazio, identica a se stessa e perfettamente definita.

Considerata in questo modo, la verità parmenidea non è tale da permettere un contrario come potrebbe essere il falso inteso come mancata corrispondenza tra quello che si dice e quello che è: piuttosto, il contrario della verità è semplicemente la sua assenza, evidente nel vagare dei mortali privi di senso critico, che vanno in giro etichettando e polarizzando il mondo, anziché rendersi conto che il vero non è quello che distingue alcuni da altri, ma quello che ci unisce.

MARTÍNEZ CORDONE, ALBERTO

Readdressing Lucas Holstenius' edition of Democrates' *Gnomai* (1638)

As is well known, the corpus of moral sentences of the Presocratic philosopher Democritus is intertwined with a group of *gnomai* attributed to a certain Democrates, who is generally regarded not as an actual ancient philosopher but as a trivialisation of Democritus' name due to the use of abbreviations in Greek manuscripts. While their content may seem trivial at some points, they contain true pearls of wisdom that address crucial ethical questions such as the value of friendships, as well as the duties they entail (*gnomai* nos. 63, 65, 66, 67), how to pursue Beauty (no. 22), Understanding (nos. 29, 30, 71), "what is necessary" (ἃ δεῖ) (number 8), or even Love itself (nº 69).
The German Humanist Lucas Holstein (Lucas Holstenius) published the full corpus of Democrates' gnomai in 1638, along with their Latin translation, drawing from a manuscript found in the Barberini collection of the Vatican Library, probably Vat. Barberin. 333. A close reading of this edition, however, shows that he altered the text at some critical points, especially when editing a *gnome* that had also been transmitted by Stobaeus' *Anthology*.

Given these and further discrepancies between the Barberini manuscript and Holstein's edition, our paper will perform a detailed analysis of Lucas Holstein's edition of Democrates' *gnomai*, as well as his translation methods from Greek to Latin, in order to offer a comprehensive account of the survival of Democrates' (or Democritus') thought in 17th-century Europe.

MATERA, ROSA

On Democritus and the principle of plenitude

This paper aims to explore the question of Democritus' commitment to the principle of plenitude (i.e., the idea that every genuine possibility is actualized somewhere at some point in the universe). I adopt Stephen Makin's interpretation of Democritus' thought as being guided by a systematic application of specific type of 'indifference argument' (expressed by the *me mallon* principle), and I try to show that postulating an additional commitment to the principle of plenitude yields a system of surprising coherence, which (I try to argue) is highly compatible with most fragments at our disposal on Democritus' doctrine. First I try to establish what textual basis we have to ascribe something like the principle of plenitude to Democritus (focusing in particular on the testimony of Aristotle); then, I explore what the consequences of adopting this principle would be for him, in particular on his cosmology and his theory of an infinite number of world, on the one hand, and on his argument for the indivisibility of the atoms, on the other hand. I try to argue that, in both cases, the principle of plenitude helps to explain certain fundamental features of Democritus' doctrine, and is therefore likely to have been explicitly adopted by him in this sense.

MATUSOVA, EKATERINA

Sophistic theories of language in the Derveni Papyrus

The paper will focus on the impact of the early sophistic theories of language on the style and argumentation of the Derveni author (P. Derveni). The text will be considered in the context of relevant information provided by the fifth century comedy playwrights and orators, on the one hand, and Plato and Aristotle, on the other. The analysis shows that the Derveni author engages deeply with the problematics of semantics as discussed by the sophists, in particular the notions of correct speech (ὀρθοέπεια, ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων), the proper meanings of words (ὀνόματα ὀρθῶς διαιρεῖν, διαίρεσις τῶν ὀνομάτων), synonymy (τὸ αὐτό) and homonymy. Aristotle notes that the main device of the sophists is homonymy, the use of which permeates the style and argumentation of the text of the papyrus. According to Aristotle, the concept of homonymy includes general notions. In the Derveni papyrus, such an approach can be observed regarding the notion of sameness (τὸ αὐτό) which the author uses in three different ways while playing with its polysemy: the sameness of synonyms, the sameness of one and many, and the sameness of the opposite aspects of one process. In certain cases, he constructs phrases which allow for a dual interpretation of the expression “the same” (a device described later by Aristotle as typically sophistic). The author merges linguistic concepts developed by the sophists with physical reality and anticipates certain schemes later reflected by Aristotle in the *Physics*. The text can be considered as witness to the development of Greek philosophical traditions (going back to Heraclitus) in the sophistic circles – an exceptional period when they were stamped with the conceptualization of language.

MAZZANTI, LEONARDO

Zeno’s Argument Against Plurality and the Case for Existence Monism

This paper analyzes the Zenonian argument against plurality extensively preserved by Philoponus (*in Ph*. 42.9-43.5 = 29B21 DK). Against the authoritative interpretation of Barnes (1979), which dismisses it as a trivial confusion, I argue that the reasoning constitutes a serious attempt to establish what Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has called existence monism.

Ontologically, the argument shows that plurality requires units that are nothing more than indivisible bare particulars. If Socrates is white or divisible into parts, he is no longer a unit but a plurality, since both Socrates and whiteness count as entities, even if of different metaphysical kinds. Any attempt to distinguish substance from property collapses once we accept that a property or a part, although not a substance, must still be treated as an entity.

The only apparent solution – affirming indivisible bare particulars – is rejected by Zeno through his axiōma: nothing indivisible, and thus unextended, can exist, for if added or removed it would fail to increase or decrease the whole. The conclusion is that no units exist and therefore no plurality exists.

As Aristotle observed, the force of the argument lies in reading "being" and "one" univocally. Strikingly, this is also the standard view in contemporary metaontology, defended by Quine (1960) and van Inwagen (1998). My contribution is primarily historical and reconstructive, aiming to shed light on how Zeno's reasoning was likely understood in its original setting. Yet, by drawing on some contemporary terminology, I also suggest that Zeno's challenge is not a trivial paradox but a rigorous attempt to demonstrate the impossibility of plurality, with implications that remain philosophically significant well beyond antiquity.

MÉNARD, ÉTIENNE

The Cosmology of Exhalations in Ionian Philosophy

Probably inspired by the parthenogenetic birth of Ouranos from Gaia in Hesiod's *Theogony* (vv. 126-128), early Ionian philosophers seem to have developed a coherent cosmological conception. It is based on a dual movement: the condensation of the primordial matter at the center to form the Earth, and the exhalation of humid air (ἰκμάς, ἀτμίς) rising to the heights to form the celestial bodies and regulate their movements. This model is rooted in a particular conception of movement, which attributes a fundamental physical role to the transformation of wet into dry and to the interactions of hot and cold.

In Anaximander, solar heat causes the evaporation of terrestrial moisture, which nourishes the Sun and Moon and moves them (A27), and contributes to the formation of living beings (A11). However, this exhalation could also explain the growth of the sphere of fire surrounding the Earth (A10). According to Anaximenes, the formation of the stars results from the rarefaction and ignition of these exhalations (A7), and may also be involved in the formation and rotation of the crystalline sky. In Xenophanes (A1 and A46) and Heraclitus (A1, A4, A11, and A12), the model of exhalations also has psychological applications (Heraclitus, B12 and B36), as we propose to demonstrate for Xenophanes.

By analyzing some of these examples, we argue the existence of an Ionian cosmological tradition, highlighting common structural features while emphasizing the specific differences of each author. Studying the process of exhalation could also allow us to reassess the idea of change through condensation and rarefaction, shared by several of the authors cited, according to our sources, and to emphasize the ontological foundations and internal coherence of their cosmological conceptions.

MENEZES DA COSTA, MICHEL

El Papiro de Derveni (VII-XXVI) como un comentario filosófico a un texto enigmático

Proponemos un cuestionamiento de la clasificación del Papiro de Derveni (VII – XXVI) como un "comentario alegórico", centrando nuestra argumentación en el adjetivo "alegórico". La pregunta central es: ¿es realmente esta la mejor manera de describir lo que hace el Autor de Derveni (AD)? La tradición inaugurada por Burkert (1968, 1970) –

que habla de “alegorización violenta” y “alegoría naturalista” – ha sido repetida desde entonces por diversos estudiosos posteriores. West (1983), por ejemplo, afirma que el AD considera “todo el poema alegórico”, basándose en los términos αἰνιγματώδης (col. VII, 5) y αἰνίζεται (col. XIII, 6). Argumentamos que tales términos significan, respectivamente, “enigmático” y “expresarse en enigmas”, no “alegórico”. West proyecta en el proceso de interpretación desarrollado por el AD un método hermenéutico que él no emplea. Pues el AD moviliza múltiples recursos para descifrar un texto que él entiende como enigmático: no solo alegoría, sino también etimología, sinonimia, homonimia, analogía. Laks (1997) hace semejante al llamar al texto “comentario alegórico” y, aunque admite que esta caracterización no es totalmente adecuada, no la abandona, sino que, redefiniendo la alegoría como “práctica religiosa de exclusión”, mantiene el rótulo de “comentario alegórico” creado por Burkert. Algo similar ocurre con Obbink (2003), quien ve en el AD un representante de una variedad extremada de la alegoría. Pero siguiendo la propia distinción de Obbink entre alegoría amplia y restringida, entendemos que el AD no encaja ni en el sentido restringido – pues no determina una correspondencia biunívoca fija entre elementos literales y alegóricos – ni en el sentido amplio, en el cual la idea de alegoría se confunde con la de interpretación en general. Como alternativa, finalmente, proponemos una clasificación más descriptiva y fiel al vocabulario del propio AD: “comentario filosófico a un texto enigmático”, pues fue así como él caracterizó su objeto.

MESQUITA, ANTÓNIO PEDRO

On What There is Not. Protagoras on the Impossibility of Falsehood and Contradiction

Among Greek philosophers, Protagoras was the first to be credited with two infamous theses regarding false speech and contradiction – namely that neither is possible. These theses have suffered from ill-repute ever since Plato and Aristotle reacted to them, in the most vigorous terms, in the *Euthydemus* and *Metaphysics* IV, respectively. In this paper, I intend to argue that there are reasons to believe that the hostility to these two theses, both in these texts and others that have followed their lead, is based on a misrepresentation of the type of ontology underlying them, an ontology that is different from the one shared by Plato and Aristotle. To be specific, I will argue that Plato and Aristotle adopt different variants of an ontology based on disjoint particulars and properties, that is to say, an ontology for which particular objects and their properties are essentially distinct kinds of entities, while Protagoras and the other philosophers who advocated these theses might have been presupposing a distinct ontology, based on primitively compound objects, conjoining particulars and properties. In the paper, I will develop and defend this hypothesis. I will next put it in context, showing that it is utterly consistent with, not to say demanded by, the interpretation of Protagoras' man-measure thesis put forth in Plato's *Theaetetus*, which, in fact, it complements. Then, I will show that some testimonies we possess about other authors who subscribed to this pair of theses, namely Prodicus of Ceos and Antistenes of Athens, strengthen this hypothesis. Finally, I will tackle the obvious objection which would consist in claiming that there is no indication in the earliest testimonies, by Plato and Aristotle, that

Protagoras could be subscribing to an alternative ontology. I will respond to this objection by showing that there is indeed such an indication and by giving a reason why there are
no others.

MOGYORÓDI, EMESE

'Disclosure', Poetry and Philosophy in Parmenides: The Journey, the Chasm and 'Erotic Mysticism' in the Proem

The paper clarifies the significance of the Proem from the perspective of Parmenides' philosophy, arguing that it serves as a complex allegory, illuminating both *Alētheia* and *Doxa*. Instead of alluding to knowledge acquisition through philosophical reasoning, the Proem references an ineffable unitive experience called *unio mystica*, which transcends rational thought and lies behind tenets on what-is (*eon*). Parmenides uses symbolism and rhetoric to express key attributes of this experience, as it can only be communicated through myth, poetry, or art. Thus, it is the poetry of the Proem which illuminates his philosophy rather than the reverse.

The paper explores the journey's ambiguous direction (to light or night?), points out parallels between its destination and what-is and focuses on the nature of the cryptic 'chasm' to illuminate the symbolism of the encounter of the *kouros* and the anonymous goddess. By examining contrasts and parallels in Hesiod and Anaximander, various mythic or ritual allusions and the *kouros*'s experiences during the journey, it argues that the Proem's symbolism is more intricate than previously thought. It creatively integrates themes of the 'hero's journey', mystery initiation, and *hieros gamos*. A key motif is the Greek wedding ritual, suggesting an erotic context for interpreting the chasm. The motifs indicate that the hero's journey and mystery initiation symbolize the quest for immortalization through knowledge, while the wedding provides an erotic context.

The paper distinguishes between the 'chasm' and the 'Gates,' asserting their different, yet related symbolic meanings. Through examining Parmenides' view of knowledge in the context of *unio mystica*, it reconciles the differences between these pivotal symbols. The 'Chasm' refers to the ineffable and rationally incomprehensible aspects of *unio mystica*, while the 'Gates' relate to erotic mysticism, providing evocative analogies for it. The latter explains the prevalence of female divinities in the Proem. Without contesting the importance of *logoi* in Parmenides' philosophy, the paper suggests that their function requires reassessment in light of the Proem's unique allegory.

MOLINA ALONSO, PABLO

Between Affection and Relativism: The Cyrenaic School and the Doctrine of the Secret Students of Protagoras in Plato's *Theaetetus*

This paper explores the epistemological and ontological parallels between the doctrine of the Kompsóteroi philosophers in Plato's *Theaetetus* and the Cyrenaic school, focusing on the question of whether Plato's depiction of these "subtle" thinkers reflects aspects

of early Cyrenaic thought. Plato presents the Kompsóteroi as secret disciples of Protagoras who develop the sophist's relativism to its ultimate consequences: identifying knowledge (*epistḗmē*) with perception (*aísthēsis*) and grounding reality in perpetual motion (*kínēsis*). Their theory entails a radical ontological indeterminism, according to which the perceiver and the perceived arise simultaneously in each act of perception.

This Platonic portrayal bears striking similarities to Cyrenaic epistemology, which regards *páthē* as private, incorrigible criteria of knowledge while denying access to the nature of external objects. Yet the Cyrenaics do not embrace the Heraclitean flux that underlies the Kompsóteroi's worldview. Instead, they confine certainty to subjective affections and develop a technical language—expressions such as "I am being whitened"—to avoid ontological commitment to external entities.

Modern scholarship has debated whether the Kompsóteroi might represent a Platonic allusion to the early Cyrenaic circle of Aristippus. While scholars such as Voula Tsouna and Ugo Zilioli have examined possible connections between Cyrenaic epistemology and Protagorean relativism, the issue remains unresolved. Through a comparative analysis of the *Theaetetus*, testimonia from Sextus Empiricus and Aristocles of Messina, and later criticisms by Colotes, this paper argues that the Kompsóteroi function as an intermediary construct through which Plato explores the limits of relativism and the epistemic status of sensation. In doing so, Plato situates the Kompsóteroi—Protagoras's hidden disciples—at the crossroads between Protagorean relativism, Cyrenaic sensualism, and his own conception of the mind's role in the apprehension of truth.

MONTAGNINO, MARCO

The numerological vision of Athena in the proem of Parmenides' poem

The hypothesis presented in this paper is part of the author's research into the knowledge contained in the journey narrated in the proem of Parmenides' poem and the identity of the goddess at whose dwelling that journey ends.

Starting from the assumption that she is Athena, the city goddess of the Phocaeans, whose cult was probably closer to that of the Egyptian goddess Neith than to that of the Olympian daughter of Zeus (M. Montagnino, When God was a Woman: From the Phocaean Cult of Athena to Parmenides' Ontology, «Open Theology», 11(1), 2025, pp. 1-17); and from the fact that for Egyptian mysticism, and later for the Pythagoreans, the number seven was attributed to the goddess Athena, as it was also considered, like the goddess, 'virgin' and 'motherless'; the intention of this paper is to show how the compositional structure of the first twenty-eight verses of the proem follows a pattern based on the geometric structure of the triangular number seven, to convey the numerological (which does not mean cabalistic) 'vision' of the goddess to whose word Parmenides entrusts his doctrine.

If we consider the triangular number seven to be the framework for the entire narrative of Parmenides' journey to reach his goddess, we could divide this 'narration' into 'paragraphs' identified by groups of verses that are clearly distinguishable on the

basis of the geometric patterns outlined by the triangular numbers below seven, which describe specific 'narrative scenes' of that journey.

This would result in a matryoshka-like narrative pattern, which, starting from the first three verses of the proem, contained in the triangular number two, would proceed scene after scene to the scene identified by the triangular number seven, according to this progression:



In accordance with the astronomical interpretation of the proem, as previously outlined in a separate publication (M. Montagnino, L'ἀλήθεια dell'«essere» nel cielo del proemio parmenideo (28, B1 D.-K.), «Sileno» XLIV, 2018, pp. 249-293), each "scene" that falls within a subsequent (larger) triangle corresponds to the introduction of an additional astronomical element, which guides the listener towards the revelation of the cosmographic seat of the anonymous goddess, lying beyond the «gate of heaven».

MORETTI, MATTEO

How Epicurean is Democritus? *Telos*, *Eudaimonia*, Hedonism, and Imperturbability in Democritus' Ethics

The term *euthymia* ('cheerfulness', 'contentment'), is likely the first to come to mind for a well-informed reader when thinking of Democritus' ethics. Yet many questions remain about its nature. First, is *euthymia* a *telos*, the ultimate goal for which we do everything else? If so, what relationship does it bear to *eudaimonia*? And to pleasure? Was Democritus a hedonist? Finally, is *euthymia* comparable to the state of 'imperturbability', *ataraxia*, described by Epicurus? These questions have been widely debated in the literature on Democritean ethics. The answers collectively determine the extent to which Democritus' ethics can be regarded as 'Epicurean'. By this, I mean not only the extent of Democritus' influence on Epicurus, but also how our greater knowledge of Epicurus shapes our interpretation of Democritus.

In this paper, after briefly addressing the authenticity of the ethical fragments and outlining some criteria of authenticity, I first argue that *euthymia* is indeed akin to a telos, following Johnson (2020). To support this, I analyse fragment D227 Laks-Most (LM) and contextualise it within the broader evidence. I then contend, with Annas (2002), that *euthymia* is comparable to *eudaimonia*, examining especially fragment D231 LM, which states that eudaimonia results 'from the delimitation and the distinction of pleasures'. While this might suggest that Democritus was a hedonist, I show that the evidence indicates otherwise. I achieve this by highlighting a discrepancy between the doxographers Diogenes Laertius (R99 LM) and Theodoret (132.4 Leszl), and by downplaying the implications of the much-discussed fragment D241 LM. Finally, building on Warren (2002) and challenging Procopé (1971), I address the question of

ataraxia and conclude that, although our sources may have exaggerated this aspect of *euthymia*, it would be overly sceptical to dismiss it entirely. Thus, my reconstruction depicts Democritus as a good Epicurean and Epicurus as a good Democritean.

NAKAYAMA, PATRICIA

The power of convention: Democritus, Thomas Hobbes, and the birth of experimental science

This study aims to analyse the reception of the theme of convention (*nomos*) found in some fragments attributed to Democritus, especially DK B 26 (Procl. in Cra. 16=D205 Most and Laks) and DK B 9 (S.E. adv. Math 7.135 = D14 Most and Laks) in the context of the emerging experimental philosophy in 17th-century England. These ideas had a significant impact on the history of the philosophy of science, particularly the air pump experiments conducted by the Royal Society, examined here in light of Thomas Hobbes' criticism. Hobbes' critique of this model of experimentation reveals his reading of atomism, highlighting the importance he attributed to the role of sensory perception and, above all, to the foundations necessary for the production of knowledge in the field of experimental science. The impact of Democritus is noticeable not only in the foundations of 17th-century science itself, but above all in the discussion about its description. The discussion presented by Hobbes is mainly directed at the mode of production and profusion of knowledge, strongly inspired by Democritus. In other words, the powerful ideas of the atomist, as received by Hobbes, revolutionised the way we produce human knowledge, with Hobbesian critiques only being absorbed in the mid-20th century, propelling science and society to levels never before seen.

NAVARRO GONZÁLEZ, ÁNGELA - PARTAL, JUAN DE DIOS

Heráclito y la tradición del enigma

Heraclitus' thinking is described as "enigmatic" by the ancients themselves. Following in the footsteps of researchers such as G. Colli and A. Berra, we would like to delve into the religious and sapiential roots of this "obscurity", which we perceive as more than a merely a stylistic feature.

The enigma is common in religious traditions: it appears in the multiple faces of Dionysus; or in the prophetic ambivalence of the Pythia. Enigma is common in religious traditions: it appears in the multiple faces of Dionysus; or in the prophetic ambivalence of the Pythia. We would like to show how Heraclitus borrows this mode of expression from religious experience for his philosophical reflection.

Religious connotations resonate in him, and with this survives a line of transmission of oral knowledge that may have run parallel to the knowledge, transmitted by epic and lyric poetry.

The religious use of riddles coexisted in sixth-century BC Greece with a more mundane use. At banquets the use of riddles and japes was common, as repositories of a popular wisdom that has not been entirely forgotten. Riddles were often formulated by women or

female figures, even children, capable of challenging Homer himself.

We will therefore attempt to link the Heraclitean style with the tradition of the seven sages. This opens a fruitful access route to his thinking, allowing us to draw parallels with his contemporaries, such as Cleobulina, daughter of Cleobulus of Lindos. Cleobulina's riddles nourish from presenting the obvious through surprising and unusual terms. This way they could act as a hinge between this lesser-known wisdom tradition and its secularisation and bifurcation between a philosophical resource, a "sophia" (Heraclitus) or a mere symposial entertainment (Cleobulina).

NÉMETH, ATTILA

Rhythmic Reconfiguration and Compatibilist Agency in Democritus

This paper advances a new compatibilist interpretation of Democritus' psychology and ethics by developing what I call the *rhysmos-model*—a systematic account of agency grounded entirely in Democritus' physicalism yet capable of explaining intentional action, self-modulation, and responsibility. Current scholarship divides between (1) mechanistic compatibilism**,** which explains agency solely in terms of necessity (cf. Johnson 2009), and (2) quasi-vitalist or non-reductive readings (cf. Rechenauer 2009), which attribute to soul-atoms a special, irreducible power of self-motion. I argue that both approaches mischaracterize Democritus' resources. Using evidence from Theophrastus *De Sensibus* 58, Hippocratic physiology, and the ethical fragments (B33, B191, B197, B242), I show that Democritus conceives the soul not as a fixed micro-mechanism nor as a vital principle, but as a dynamically reconfigurable pattern of atomic motion.

On this interpretation, *rhysmos*—not merely the "shape" of atoms, but the organization and proportionality of their motions (cf. Gomes 2019)—provides the conceptual link that unifies Democritus' physiology of thought, his account of cognitive variability, and his ethics of self-cultivation. Thinking arises when the soul achieves symmetrical balance after motion; ethical progress consists in restoring and stabilizing this balance through attentional discipline, selective memory, education, and effort. Crucially, these practices do not introduce new causal powers but operate by re-patterning the same physical substrate, rendering freedom and responsibility fully compatible with Democritean necessity.

The *rhysmos*-model thus offers a unified reading of Democritus' psychology and ethics that avoids both reductive mechanism and quasi-emergentism. It shows that Democritus can coherently explain intentional agency, not by suspending physical necessity, but by recognizing the soul's capacity to reorganize itself within it. This reconceptualization has significant implications for the history of Presocratic moral psychology and for the interpretation of early physicalist accounts of agency.

Select Bibliography:

Gomes, G.L. (2019), 'On Democritean *Rhysmos*', *Archai* 27: 1-37.

Johnson, M.R. (2009), 'Spontaneity, Democritean Causality and Freedom', *Elenchos* 30.1: 5-52.

Rechenauer, G. (2009), 'Demokrits Seelenmodell und die Prinzipien der atomistischen Physik', in D. Frede, B. Reis (eds.), *Body and Soul in Ancient Philosophy*, 111-142, Berlin-New York: De Gruyter.

NICOLAIDES, DEMETRIS

Crystallized Space and Frozen Time: The Universes of Physicist Parmenides and Philosopher Einstein

Parmenides, the philosopher of ontology, contemplated the most fundamental of questions: How can there be something instead of nothing? And what are the properties of that which does exist? Through purely rational arguments he marvelously reasoned out an answer that overturned completely the common view of the world around us. Nature—what-is, the *Being*—he argued, exists because nonexistence—what-is-not, *Not-Being*—is an impossibility. And, change, he thought, is logically impossible too, so what is, is one and unchangeable! This dazzling absolute monism, although in bold disagreement with the apparent reality of diversified nature in constant flux, curiously appears validated by the scientifically verified theory of a well-known genius.

Emboldened by his theory of relativity, Einstein considers the universe as a four-dimensional "block"—a spacetime continuum which, in a simplified three-dimensional analogy, is like a loaf of bread—that, remarkably, contains not only all points of space, but also *all moments of time* (of past, present, and future) *always*, and *with* their corresponding events/breadcrumbs (everything that happened, is happening, and will happen), and where change is an illusion. He said, "For we convinced physicists, the distinction between past, present, and future is only an illusion, however persistent." In the block universe, the past is not gone, it is present (it exists); and the future, like the present, is, well, present too. Space and time in relativity have no separate existence; rather, together, as a single entity, they weave the physical fabric of the universe (the bread) and always exist (as do the breadcrumbs in the bread).With everything already present always, there is neither space nor time or a need for any change. Parmenides might "now"—*someone's* now, anyway—be smiling, saying "told you so."

NOGUEIRA FONTES, LUIS MARCIO

[Melissus], DK30B9

DK30B9, purportedly a text by Melissus, states that being lacks body (σῶμα) and depth (πάχος) and parts (μόρια). This is striking, for in other texts Melissus claims that being is unlimited in extension (μέγεθος) (DK30B3), that it is full (πλέων), with no void (DKB7.7-10). One thinks that having extension and being full would entail having at least depth and perhaps even a body. Thus, the puzzle is formed.

This puzzle has attracted the attention of many scholars. Recent attempts at solving it admit B9 as a genuine Melissan fragment, and then resort to reinterpreting the meaning of one or more of these key words, so as to make the fragments consistent. Clever as these attempts are, I believe they fail. I will review some of these attempts and argue why I think they fail.

This failure, I believe, should make us question B9's authenticity. And this is what I'll do in my paper: I will defend that B9 is not a text (or a paraphrase of an argument) by Melissus. Apart from the glaring contradictions between B9 and other fragments by

Melissus, the reports we have about Melissus do not sit well with the claims in B9. Even more, I think a detailed look into the Simplicean texts that are behind B9 will further enhance my case.

Now, if I am right and B9 is inauthentic, two questions remain: (i) how could Simplicius have mistakenly attributed the reasoning in B9 to Melissus?; and (ii) where does B9 come from?. I will have something to say about (i), but I will focus on (ii): I will defend and develop the idea that B9 is actually a piece of reasoning that goes back to Zeno.

PADILLA, TERESA

La φύσις de Anaxágoras como modelo inteligente, ordenado, evolutivo y expansivo del Universo

El propósito de esta ponencia será mostrar cómo la física filosófica de Anaxágoras despliega un modelo ecléctico, pero altamente científico, sobre los principios y el origen de la configuración del Universo. Su modelo será biológico, en el sentido de que expondrá una historia del mundo con un origen único de las cosas. Por un lado, revivirá la física jónica de buscar un primer principio material al bosquejar una historia que permita dar razón del tránsito que va de la unidad originaria a la multiplicidad del estado actual en términos prosísticos y científico-filosóficos directos. Por otro, recurrirá a la lógica eleática de la imposibilidad de la nada y del no ser y sustentará dos principios ordenadores: uno material y otro inteligente. La evolución del Universo de Anaxágoras es lineal, irreversible y tiene al Noῦς como factor de ordenación única, progresiva, basada en una mezcla originaria informe en expansión espacial ordenada.

Su punto de partida será que todo está en todo y que todo existe desde el principio. Esto es, que la materia, de la que todo procede, será concebida como una e indefinidamente divisible, pero compuesta de multiplicidad de ingredientes que se hallan presentes en todo lo existente en diferentes proporciones y preponderancias para dar lugar a la variedad cualitativa. Esto le permitirá sustentar la coexistencia de la unidad y la multiplicidad.

La evolución cosmogónica es producto del proceso organizativo del mundo que va desde la unidad indiferenciada de los factores constitutivos hasta el orden actual. Dicho desarrollo es dirigido por un principio o Inteligencia material omnisciente, omnipotente, puro, autónomo responsable de la puesta en marcha del proceso de transformación de la materia única y un principio intermedio que son las semillas o factores, a saber, porciones de materia en determinadas preponderancias de unas cosas sobre otras (Fr. 4). El número de las cosas es finito, pero su division es infinita, por eso son infinitas en cantidad (Fr. 5),

Todas las cosas participan de todo y no es posible ser por separado, de manera que no hay partes mínimas separables, puesto que no hay un mínimo (Fr. 6),

El cambio es definido en terminos redistributivos de los factores de la misma materia. De forma que nada nace ni perece, en términos absolutos. Los procesos de separación son producto de la rotación a manera de torbellino, resultado de la fuerza de la velocidad, en donde confluyen los movimientos centrífugos y centrípetos, con vistas a redistribuir los elementos de la materia (Fr. 9).

Anaxagoras' φύσις as an intelligent, ordered, evolutionary and expansive model of the Universe

The aim of this paper is to show how the philosophical physics of Anaxagoras deploys an eclectic model, but highly scientific, concerning the principles and origin of the Universe' configuration. His model is biological, in the sense that he will give an account of a world's history with a unique origin of things. On the one hand, he revitalizes the Ionian physics in the sense of searching a material first principle when he outlines a history that permits give reason of the transit that goes from the original unity to the multiplicity of the actual state in prose and scientific-philosophical terms. On the other hand, he will resort to the Eleatic logic of the impossibility of nothingness and not-being and will support two ordering principles: one material and another intelligent. The evolution of Anaxagoras' universe is linear, irreversible and has the Noῦς as his factor or unique, progressive order, based in an original, formless mixture in an ordered spatial expansion.

His point of departure will be that everything is in everything and that everything exists from the beginning. That is, matter, from which everything comes from, will be conceived as one and indefinitely divisible, but compound of a multiplicity of ingredients which are present in everything in different proportions and preponderances for giving rise of a qualitative variety. That will permit him to support a coexistence of unity and multiplicity.

The Cosmogonic evolution is the product of the organizational process of the world which goes from the undifferentiated unity of the constitutive factors to the actual order. This development is directed by an Omniscient, Omnipotent, pure, autonomous principle which is responsible of the setting off of the transformative process of a unique matter and an intermediate principle that are the seeds or factors, that is, portions of matter in determinate preponderances of things upon others (Fr. 4). The number of things is finite, but its division is infinite, that is why its quantity is infinite too (Fr. 5).

Everything participates of everything and it is not possible to be separated, as a consequence, there is not a minimum (Fr. 6).

Change is defined in redistributive terms of factors of the same matter. Therefore, nothing perishes in absolute terms. Separative processes are a product of rotation by a way of a whirlwind as a result of the speed force in which the centrifugal and centripetal movements converge with the aim of redistributing the elements of matter (Fr.9).

PAJÓN LEYRA, IGNACIO

Parménides y Gorgias en las raíces del escepticismo

El tratado atribuido a Gorgias de Leontinos *Sobre el no ser o sobre la naturaleza* está considerado como uno de los puntos de partida en la genealogía del escepticismo filosófico más interesantes y controvertidos. Las tres radicales tesis en las que se articula, en especial la segunda de ellas, se han interpretado en muchas ocasiones como uno de los elementos constitutivos destacados del cuestionamiento del conocimiento

que terminarán por dar origen, ya en época helenística, a la corriente filosófica del escepticismo pirrónico. Como es sabido, las tres tesis del tratado entran en polémica con las bases ontológicas de la filosofía eleática, constituyendo un original y efectivo aparato argumental que se orienta a la refutación de uno de los elementos más destacados del pensamiento de Parménides: la relación de correspondencia entre ser, pensar y decir. Gorgias invierte este marco ontológico al afirmar la inexistencia, la incognoscibilidad y la incomunicabilidad del ser, desestabilizando las bases mismas de la ontología tradicional y sitúa el lenguaje como un instrumento de persuasión más que como vehículo de enunciación de la verdad.

En esta comunicación se planteará cuál es el alcance ontológico y epistémico de esta crítica, dónde sitúa los límites entre el juego retórico y el argumento refutativo respecto del saber y de qué manera puede considerarse como una correcta base fundante de la postura escéptica – explicitada siglos después por el pirronismo – sobre el problema de la justificación del conocimiento en tanto que reflexión sobre los límites de la razón humana y de la representación lingüística.

PAVANI, ANNA

Nous ex machina? Plato's Socrates and Aristotle on Anaxagoras alleged "unintelligent intellect"

Is it true that, despite placing the Nous among the first principles, "Anaxagoras makes not use of it in coming-to-be"?[1] According to Aristotle, Anaxagoras uses the Nous as a *deus ex machina* in world making (*Met*. A.3, 985a18–21).[2] The Socrates of the *Phaedo* would also agree that "Mr. Mind," as Anaxagoras was deceptively nicknamed, fails to provide a final explanation of the actual arrangement of the universe.

I shall show that in his autobiographical excursus (*Phd*. 96a6–102a1) Socrates has his own good reasons to accuse Anaxagoras of not providing a true aitia, namely an account of why the actual arrangement of the kosmos is for the best (*Phd*. 97c5–6).[3] The same holds true for Aristotle's accusation, and yet Anaxagoras can be proved innocent of the charges – so I shall argue by distinguishing *aitia* and *aition* and by explaining what Anaxagoras (and not Plato's Socrates or Aristotle) expects from the latter.[4] By providing a close textual analysis of the most extensive preserved fragment on "its nature, its Powers (both efficient and epistemic),"[5] namely B12, I aim to show that the Nous can be said to be responsable for the arrangement of the universe. The analysis of three key passages from Aristotle's *De Anima* shall furthermore show that this arrangement derives from knowledge.[6]

References

Curd (2007) = *Anaxagoras of Clazomenae. Fragments and Testimonia. A text and translation with notes and essays by Curd Patricia*. Toronto Buffalo London: University of Toronto Press.

Graham (1994) = Graham D. W. (1994). *The Postulates of Anaxagoras*. In: *Apeiron* (27): 77–121.

Lennox (1985) = Lennox, J. (1985). *Plato's unnatural teleology*. In: D. O'Meara (ed.), *Platonic investigations*. Washington: Catholic University of America Press: 195–218.
Müller (2017) = Müller, J. (2017). *Socrates and Natural Philosophy: The Testimony of Plato's* Phaedo. In: A. Stavru and C. Moore (eds.), *Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue*. Leiden: Brill: 348–366.
Ross (1924) = Ross W. D. (1924). *Aristotle's Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

1 DK 59 B 13, translations of Anaxagoras' fragments are by Curd (2007).
2 "He drags it in (παρέλκει) whenever he is puzzled about the reason why something is as it is necessarily." As Ross
remarks *ad locum*, παρέλκει makes clear that the μηχανή here refers to the stage *deus ex machina*.
3 See Müller (2017: 356) and Graham (1994: 111).
4 On the distinction between *aition* and *aitia*, see Lennox (1985: 197).
5 Curd (2007: 193).
6 *De Anima* I.2 405a13–18, I.2. 405b19–21, and 429a18–20.

PEIXOTO, MIRIAM

Between hubris and pleonexia: the faces of excess in Democritus' ethics

In one of the most extensive aphorisms transmitted to us by Stobaeus, Democritus offers us an 'X-ray', a 'diagnosis', and a 'prognosis' of human life under the sign of excess. Let us see what he says in the first lines of fragment DK68B191. The states of "stability" (εὐσταθής) and "contentment" (εὐθυμίη) that come about through moderation (μετριότης) and proportion (συμμετρία) cease to exist when lacks and excesses (τὰ δ᾽ ἐλλείποντα καὶ ὑπερβάλλοντα) prevail. Lack and excess both stem from immoderate behavior. And immoderation is therefore an obstacle to achieving what humans aspire to. It is a source of disturbance (ταραχή), fear (φόβος), and superstition (δεισιδαιμονίη) for them (DK68A1). The notion of immoderation is sometimes indicated by various terms: (i) terms formed by adding the privative alpha to the root μετρ-: ἀμέτρητος (DK68B285), ἀμετρίη (DK68C3), ἄμετρος (DK68 B70, C7); (ii) by the preposition ὑπέρ-, or by terms composed of it, as is the case with the verb ὑπερβάλλω and the noun ὑπερβολή In fragment DK68B3, the prefix before the accusatives δύναμιν and φύσιν, advice to "undertake nothing that is above your strength and your nature (ὑπέρ τε δύναμιν αἱρεῖσθαι τὴν ἑωυτοῦ καὶ φύσιν)", and the verb ὑπερβάλλω is found in DK68B233: "If someone goes beyond the measure (ὑπερβάλλοι τὸ μέτριον), the most delicious things would completely cease to be delicious." As for ὑπερβολή, it is the term that is diametrically opposed to the term ἔλλειψις in fragment DK68B102, like in DK68B191: "Balance is beautiful in all things: excess and deficiency (ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις) do not seem so to me." And finally, we have a series of expressions that allude to desires or the act of desiring: τὸ ἀμέτρως ἐπιθυμεῖν (DK68B70), τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀεὶ, ἡ τοῦ πλέονος ἐπιθυμίη (DK68B224). Warnings about the different manifestations of

excess and their harmful consequences for human existence are not a new phenomenon in the reflections that preceded and were made by the contemporaries of the first thinkers. As we shall see, Democritus was not content to denounce and censure the excessive behavior of humans, but endeavored to investigate its nature, its internal and external causes, to identify and evaluate its consequences for individuals and for the human community.

PERRICONE, FABIO

Death and Ethics in Democritus' Thanatology: A Possible Reconstruction

This paper reconstructs and analyzes the fragments and *testimonia* concerning Democritus' conception of death, arguing that his thanatology plays a central role in his ethical outlook. Adopting James Warren's (2007) methodological indication regarding the need to assess the "combined persuasive weight" of connections between Democritus' fields of thought, I propose that these reflections are not marginal moral remarks but constitute a coherent dimension that integrates physical theory, biological investigation, and ethical practice. The starting point is the evidence preserved in Philodemus' *De morte* (68 B 1a DK) and in other fragments about corpses and dying (B1, 199, 201, 206 DK). While these texts primarily document physiological states, I propose to interpret the scientific curiosity evident therein in conjunction with Democritus' broader ethical precepts, establishing a link often absent in the fragments themselves. Crucially, the paper also reevaluates the anecdotes concerning Democritus' own death, arguing that these biographical traditions preserve traces of an ethical coherence that complements the theoretical remains. Building on Warren's earlier analysis (2002, 2007) and engaging with Taylor's (1999, 2007) reconstruction of Democritean psychology, I argue that Democritus conceptualizes death not simply as the dispersal of atomic compounds, but as a biological process – distinct from the later Lucretian focus on the state of non-existence – whose ethical relevance depends on the human capacity to anticipate it through rational cultivation. Collecting and interpreting these testimonies allows us to re-evaluate the place of Democritus' ethical thought, counterbalancing Aristotle's relative neglect of his moral fragments. This paper shows that Democritus offered an integrated model in which the atomic structure of the human being grounds both the physical explanation of death and the possibility of ethical agency.

PIANGERELLI, FEDERICA

Parmenides, Zeno, and the Eleatic Stranger. A "Philosophical Lineage" in Plato's *Sophist*?

In Plato's *Sophist*, the Eleatic Stranger is introduced as a real philosopher and a follower of Parmenides and Zeno (*Soph.*, 216a3-4). However, this origin is problematic, as Melissus's radicalisation caused such a profound crisis in Eleaticism that it seemed to leave no space for any successors. Therefore, we should ask why Plato chooses this figure to lead the dialogue's reasoning and why he explicitly mentions both Parmenides and Zeno. To provide possible answers to these questions, this paper considers the reasons that compel the

Eleatic Stranger to "torture" (βασανίζειν) Parmenides' doctrine (*Soph.*, 237b2, 241d6), *without committing parricide* (*Soph*., 241d3).

The hypothesis is that the Stranger uses Zeno's dialectic (*Parm.*, 127e-128d) not so much to refute Parmenides' adversaries, but rather to test the conceptual validity of the Parmenidean theory. His aim is to examine the thesis that "not-being is", based on the belief that, since it is forbidden by Parmenides, it would refute itself and thereby confirm the solidity of his master's position. Nevertheless, when taken to its logical conclusion, this thesis calls into question the internal coherence of Parmenides' reflections. Hence, the Stranger is forced *to go beyond* Parmenides *to save* him not from his enemies, but from the theoretical weaknesses of his own system of knowledge. For this reason, the Eleatic performs a "courageous and revolutionary" act by distinguishing, with conceptual depth, a non-being that is "opposite" to being from a non-being that is "different" to being (*Soph*., 258c-259b).

This crucial stage, among other issues, suggests that, although the origin of the Eleatic Stranger is impossible from a historical standpoint, it is decisive at a conceptual level. Indeed, this figure embodies the most coherent "third generation" of Eleaticism, presenting himself as a faithful– and thus critical – disciple of both Parmenides and Zeno, and developing their "philosophical lineage" in its most mature form.

PITTELOUD, LUCA

La Nature aime à se cacher : Rilke, Ramuz et l'écho moderne d'un fragment d'Héraclite

In *Le Voile* d'Isis. Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de nature, Pierre Hadot traces the complex genealogy of the Heraclitean aphorism "Nature loves to hide" — φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ (B123 DK). According to Hadot, this obscure fragment admits multiple and possibly conflicting interpretations: (1) the inner constitution of each thing tends to conceal itself; (2) each thing resists being revealed; (3) the origin of things is difficult to know; or (4) what brings forth tends also to make disappear. From these possibilities, Hadot reconstructs the ambiguous history of humanity's relation to nature—oscillating between violence and reverence, between the desire to unveil and the impulse to contemplate.

While Hadot provides a detailed analysis of some interpretations of this fragment, such as those of Porphyry or Schiller, he only briefly mentions other significant modern echoes without exploring them. This paper focuses on two of these cases: Rainer Maria Rilke's *Duino Elegies* and Charles Ferdinand Ramuz's *Présence de la Mort*. Both authors, in different linguistic and cultural contexts, reformulate the Heraclitean tension between the visible and the invisible, between revelation and concealment. By examining how Rilke and Ramuz each transform the motif of nature's hiddenness into a poetic and existential attitude, this paper argues that both writers express a similar vision of our relation to the natural world—one grounded in acceptance, reverence, and creative humility before what exceeds human understanding. Through their works, the Heraclitean aphorism reemerges not as a metaphysical statement but as an invitation to dwell poetically within the mystery of nature. In this way, the paper shows how the

ancient fragment continues to inspire modern literature's reflection on the limits and possibilities of revealing the world.

POMPEI, DILETTA

The Role of the Seven Sages in Stobaeus' *Anthologion*: A Connection between Archaic Philosophy and Neoplatonic Ethics

This paper aims to investigate the role of the "Sayings of the Seven Sages" (DK 10 A) in Stobaeus' *Anthologion* (ed. Wachsmuth–Hense, 1894–1912), with a particular focus on their reception and function within a likely Neoplatonic context in which Stobaeus may have been active. It demonstrates how Stobaeus consciously selected these early gnomic maxims as ethically and pedagogically meaningful passages, despite their origin in a very different historical and philosophical context. Although the term "Seven Sages" refers to a complex and ill-defined group, this study focuses on those who are consistently identified in the tradition and presented in the Diels–Kranz edition.

Through a lexical and philosophical analysis of the excerpts attributed to the Seven Sages, the paper explores how archaic moral principles were received, adapted and integrated into the *Anthologion*, revealing the conscious word choices and editorial strategies employed by Stobaeus. Within a context closely aligned with the philosophy of Iamblichus, which emphasises not only the contemplative dimension of the intellect, but also its theurgical and practical aspects, the presence of the "Sayings of the Seven Sages" provides a practical and theoretical starting point. They function as exempla connecting archaic philosophy to late-antique ethics, while simultaneously offering practical and shareable precepts, even for those outside the Greek philosophical environment. The inclusion of passages from Plutarch's *Septem Sapientium Convivium* further underscores Stobaeus' interest in restoring civic virtues that had been largely downplayed in early Neoplatonism.

In conclusion, this paper shows that, despite the centuries separating the philosophy expressed in the Sayings of the Seven from Stobaeus' era, these maxims continue to provide both theoretical guidance and practical advice, demonstrating their enduring relevance as a link between archaic and late-antique ethical thought.

PROVENZA, ANTONIETTA

Paths of perception. Alcmaeon, Philolaus and Aristoxenus on aisthēsis and hearing

Pythagorean communities thrieved in Southern Italy at the same time as the study and practice of medicine, whose leading exponent was Alcmaeon of Croton, underwent a major development. So, it is likely that Philolaus, the main source on the Pythagoreans for Aristotle, himself a Crotonian and probably the first Pythagorean author (Huffman 1993: 12-16), became acquainted with Alcmaeon's doctrines when young, and that the latters prompted his interest in medical matters (Philol. Test. A27-28 Huffman). Moreover, for what concerns Pythagoreans, a relationship between the notions of *isonomia* and *harmonia*, involving both music and politics, seems to set the ground for

Alcmaeon's considerations on the relationship between medicine and politics.

The scope of my paper is to investigate the influence, through Philolaus (see esp. fr. 6 Huffman) and Archytas (see esp. fr. 2 Huffman) – a disciple of the latter – of Alcmaeon's doctrine of *isonomia* and his speculation concerning knowledge and perception (in part. 24 B 4 D.-K. = test. 11 Wöhrle) on Aristoxenus of Tarentum, a Peripatetic with a strong Pythagorean background, and his consideration of *aisthēsis* as the most important mean for understanding and judging music. The relevant impact of doctrines elaborated in Magna Graecia on the Aristoxenian musical speculation would therefore receive further support.

Bibliography

A. Barker, *Music and Perception. A Study in Aristoxenus*, "JHS" 98.1978, 9-16.

A. Barker, *Greek Musical Writings*. II. *Acoustic and Harmonic Theory*, Cambridge, 1989.

A. Barker, *The Science of Harmonics in Classical Greece*, Cambridge 2007.

E. Fletcher, *Aisthēsis, Reason and Appetite in the Timaeus*, "Phronesis" 61.4, 2016, 397-434.

C.A. Huffman, ed., *Philolaus of Croton. Pythagorean and Presocratic*, Cambridge 1993.

C.A. Huffman, ed., *Archytas of Tarentum. Pythagorean, Philosopher and Mathematician King*, Cambridge 2005.

C.A. Huffman, *Alcmaeon*, in *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosphy*, 2003 (substantially revisioned 2021): https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/alcmaeon/

C.A. Huffman, ed., *Aristoxenus of Tarentum. Discussion*, New Brunswick (NJ) 2012.

J. Longrigg, *Greek Rational Medicine. Philosophy and Medicine from Alcmaeon to the Alexandrians*, London 1993.

A. Meriani, *Sulla musica greca antica. Studi e ricerche*, Napoli 2003.

L. Perilli, *Alcmeone di Crotone tra filosofia e scienza. Per una nuova edizione delle fonti*, "QUCC" 69.3, 2001, 55-79.

A. Provenza, *Catarsi ed ethos. La musica tra formazione del carattere e cura dei mali nella Grecia antica*, Palermo 2002 (open access: https://unipapress.com/book/catarsi-ed-ethos/).

G. Wöhrle, ed., *Alkmaion von Kroton, Hippon von Metapont und Menestor von Sybaris*, Berlin-Boston 2022.

PULPITO, MASSIMO

A New Fragment of Zeno of Elea

We have only a handful of direct fragments from Zeno of Elea: Diels collected four (29 B1-4); Kranz later added a fifth (B5). The only fragment concerning motion is B4, transmitted by Diogenes, according to which what moves cannot move either in the place where it is or in the place where it is not. Apart from B4, none of Zeno's paradoxes of motion appears to have survived in fragments; our knowledge of them depends almost entirely on Aristotle's testimony. Among the four arguments discussed in the *Physics*, the most famous is that of Achilles and the Tortoise, which Aristotle refers to simply as "the Achilles", indicating its notoriety already in the fourth century BCE. Aristotle presents it as based on a race between "the faster" and "the

slower." If the identity of the faster pursuer can be inferred from Aristotle's designation of the argument, that of the pursued (the tortoise) emerges only in the late paraphrase of the *Physics* by Themistius and subsequently in the commentary of Simplicius, who appears to depend directly on Themistius. Themistius introduces details absent from Aristotle – not only the tortoise, but also a reference to Hector – and does so with a formulation that signals the intention to reproduce the original wording of Zeno's treatise. In this paper, I argue that this passage of Themistius preserves a brief new fragment of Zeno (the sixth), which moreover points to a likely Homeric inspiration behind the paradox.

RAMÓN CÁMARA, BEGOÑA

On the Role Played by the Book of Anaxagoras in Plato's *Phaedo* and *Timaeus*

In the account given by Socrates in the *Phaedo* of his intellectual biography, the figure of Anaxagoras and his doctrine of Mind, as the rational agent that drives motion and orders the universe, play a central role. Following the principle set out by the philosopher from Clazomenae, according to which "it is Mind that arranges all things and is the cause of everything" (νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, 97c), Socrates attributes to the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) the status of the first efficient cause and the ultimate final cause—the cause that keeps the universe alive and gives it unity and sense—in contrast with material causes. This use of the term implies a certain fundamental hypothesis about the general order of things, namely, that the universe is a κόσμος, a set of parts ordered according to a rational structure and plan in which everything originates for the sake of some end. This in turn implies that, in order to understand the structure of the universe and account for its order and beauty, it must be studied in light of the good. This is, as I think, the meaning of "the second sailing" (δεύτερος πλοῦς) in search of the true causes of generation and corruption of beings discussed in this dialogue. Influenced in this way by Anaxagoras, Socrates departs from the kind of philosophy that in the systems of Leucippus and Democritus had led to a strictly mechanistic conception of the order of nature, and instead advocates for teleologism. The purpose of this paper is to analyze in detail the role played by Anaxagoras's philosophy in these passages of the *Phaedo*, as well as its relation to the project carried out by Plato in the *Timaeus*.

REHBINDER, ANDRÉ

The Influence of Logos on the Soul: Gorgias, Empedocles and the Hippocratic Collection

In my presentation, I will scrutinize the exact nature of logos according to Gorgias, as well as its influence on the soul in the *Encomium of Helen* and the *Defense of Palamedes*. I will attempt to demonstrate two hypotheses:

1) The theory of perception as the passage of flux through appropriate holes, which Gorgias and his school inherited from Empedocles, according to Plato's *Meno* (76c6–d5), can serve as a model to understand the action of logos on the soul.

2) Gorgias conceives of the nature of logos in a manner similar to how some physicists in the Hippocratic Collection conceive of air.

To prove these statements, I will first show the parallelism between the *logos* argument (§ 8–14) and the *opsis* argument (§ 15–19) in the *Encomium of Helen*: In both arguments, there is an intermediate instance that transmits an external factor's influence to the soul. In the *logos* argument, the intermediate instance is *doxa*, and the external factor is *logos*. In the *opsis* argument, the intermediate instance is *opsis* itself, and the external factor is *ta orômena pragmata* ("things seen"). Thus, the action of logos on the soul is comparable to perception via *doxa*.

Second, I will study the implications of probable intertextual links between the Hippocratic Collection and the *Encomium of Helen*. In the treatise *On Airs*, 3.3, air is defined as follows:

> Οὗτος δὲ μέγιστος ἐν τοῖσι πᾶσι τῶν πάντων δυνάστης ἐστίν· (…) ἀλλὰ μήν ἐστί γε τῇ μὲν ὄψει ἀφανὴς, τῷ δὲ λογισμῷ φανερός.
> This one [air] is the mightiest master, which reigns on everything in all respects. However, it is not visible by sight, but evident to the mind.

This definition seems very close to Gorgias's definition of *logos* as δυνάστης μέγας (…), ὃς σμικροτάτῳ σώματι καὶ ἀφανεστάτῳ θειότατα ἔργα ἀποτελεῖ—"a mighty master, which, by the smallest and most invisible body, accomplishes the most divine actions." (*EH* § 8). This allows us to draw a parallel between the conception of air and its role in thinking in this Hippocratic treatise and Gorgias's conception of logos.

REUS ENGLER, MAICON

Gorgias and the Alteration of Consciousness: On the Effect of Lógos

Gorgias is not the first to observe that discourse possesses the capacity to alter consciousness. The connection between discourse and emotions (páthe) renders this insight an achievement of Greek civilization as a whole. However, he is responsible for employing concepts that would later exert considerable influence on ancient rhetoric, especially on Plato and Aristotle. In Homer and Hesiod, v. g., poetry produces various effects on the audience, which may be grouped into two principal registers: the psychological, involving emotions such as suffering (*pónos*), pity (*eleeinón*) (*Od*. VIII, 521–531), fear (*phóbos*), pleasure (*térpsis*), and longing (*pothéō*); and the magical religious, involving enchantments (*thelktḗria*) (*Od*. VIII, 336–344) and the forgetting (*lēsmosýnē*) of present misfortunes (*Th*. 53–57). Gorgias adopts both registers. His strategy consists in asserting that these effects do not derive from the Muses or from anyother divine power, but from *lógos* itself, since he defines poetry as a discourse endowed with meter (*Hel*. 9). Thus, in a clear moment of secularization, he reinterprets within a human sphere what had previously been conceived as divine. The present paper

aims to examine more closely the concepts employed by the sophist. In the medicinal register, I analyze the occurrence of four principal notions: *ékplēxis*, *páthēma*, *éxtasis*, and *apátē*. In the magical-religious register, I analyze two concepts: *phármakon* and *epōdē*. Since all these concepts are employed to describe the effect of discourse, I argue that they constitute elements of a robust theory of rhetorical effect (*Wirkungsästhetik*). Moreover, I maintain their seminal character and reveal their influence on Plato's theory of art and his conception of philosophy.

RUSSO GÓMEZ, ALESSANDRO

La «inocencia del devenir»: Anaxágoras y Heráclito interpretados por Nietzsche

Nietzsche recurre, principalmente, a Anaxágoras y a Heráclito para mostrar otra alternativa a la moralización de la naturaleza: la «inocencia del devenir». Dichos pensadores son elogiados por sus explicaciones mecanicistas, en las que la *phýsis* es desprovista de finalidad y, además, encarna la antítesis del dualismo platónico. Anaxágoras y Heráclito remiten, según Nietzsche, a la «*Künstleristche Weltbetracthung*», a saber, a la «consideración estética del mundo», en la que la naturaleza es explicada sin recurrir a ningún principio teleológico, sino que tan solo es vista como mezcla del azar y la necesidad. La interpretación nietzscheana de ambos presocráticos en sus escritos de juventud es el preludio de su crítica al nihilismo — propia de su etapa de madurez —, por lo que los conceptos de «Πόλεμος» y de «νους» son considerados como una afirmación plena de la vida. De esta manera, es fundamental la lectura que realiza Nietzsche del pensamiento presocrático debido a la influencia que el mundo antiguo adquiere en su obra, tal y como se ve en la atención dedicada al fragmento 53 DK de Heráclito: la «inocencia» remite a la imagen del niño que juega con el propio devenir. Ya en *Los filósofos preplatónicos* y en *La filosofía en la época trágica de los griegos*, entre otros escritos, Nietzsche sostiene que la actividad creativa es posibilitada por la ausencia de un sentido previamente dado. Así, Nietzsche divisa en Anaxágoras y Heráclito la actitud trágica de Dioniso, de modo que se entreven las conexiones profundas entre la filosofía presocrática y la contemporaneidad de su obra como fruto de su formación en filología clásica.

SÁNCHEZ CASTRO, LILIANA CAROLINA

Heraclitus in dialogue with contemporary environmental philosophy

Ecology is understood as a discipline aiming to minimize human impact on nature. Its task gravitates around the concept of "sustainability," being primarily focused on human well-being. Because of this, some environmental philosophers have criticized that concept in order to privilege the thesis that an ecological movement must seek a radical transformation of the relationship that humans establish with the natural world, by changing the utilitarian attitude and recognizing its intrinsic value: the problem of ecology is, then, not only technical, but ethical and political.

In 2013, the influential environmental philosopher Baird Callicott published his "NeoPresocratic Manifesto" in the journal *Environmental Studies*. There, Callicott advocates for the recovery of Presocratic philosophy to reorient contemporary scientific and everyday sensibilities toward a less harmful and less instrumental relationship with the environment and its creatures. This idea was further developed in 2018 when, together with John van Buren and Keith Brown, he published *Greek Natural Philosophy: The Presocratics and Their Importance for Environmental Philosophy*. In it, Callicott and his two collaborators present the testimonies of the Presocratics, aligning them with topics of environmental concern. However, they do not fully develop the arguments that could give meaning to these fragments within the environmental debate.

In this paper, I would like to take up Callicott's challenge and construct an argument that reveals Heraclitus's role in this project. To this end, I propose presenting a reconstruction of the Heraclitean notion of nature, based on the metaphysics of *logos*, and demonstrating how it fits into the conception of a way of life in harmony with nature. Through an analysis of Heraclitus's natural thought and his notion of humankind, following Callicott's line of thought, I will try to demonstrate the advantages of recovering this conception in restoring our damaged relationship with the natural world, a relationship whose catastrophic consequences are evident in contemporary life.

SANTANIELLO, CARLO

Presocratic Echoes: Looking for One's Words in Others' Works

This contribution concerns a sort of 'remote dialogue' among Presocratics — mainly between Empedocles and Parmenides, i.e. the way how Empedocles reacts to a set of several assertions by the Eleates, and why he does so. First of all, this research is aimed at clarifying the relationship among presocratic authors; and surely the 'echoes' will be, more often than not, inspired by dissent and the desire to polemicize on substantial philosophical themes — just in order to mention a couple of examples, think of Parm. fr. 8.26 (ἀκίνητον) ~ Emp. fr. 17.13 (ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλον); and Parm. fr. 8.52 (κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλόν) ~ Emp. fr. 17.26 (λόγου στόλον οὐκ ἀπατηλόν). Secondly, a few cases show complex contrasts, as the epistemological passages in Parm. frr. 6–7 (cp. fr. 8) and Emp. fr. 3, where the two philosophers differ from each other as to the roles assigned to mind and senses. Some other times it is not Empedocles' will to oppose the Eleates that comes to the fore, but rather his ability to gather suggestions from masters and adversaries. It is so when the Acragantine is inspired by an abstract image like the going astray of the mind (Parm. fr. 6.6: πλακτόν νόον) and, above all, of the limbs (fr. 16.1: μελέων πολυπλάγκτων, whatever this may imply), and he comes up with the description of wandering limbs during the zoogony (Emp. frr. 57–58: ἐπλάζοντο, ἐπλανᾶτο, the same root as the words employed by Parmenides). Lastly, commentators of a central passage in Parmenidean exegesis like fr. 1.31-32 can find it useful to compare passages from both Heraclitus and Empedocles; this time the latter's allusion to the Eleates will perhaps appear less explicit than elsewhere, but not less significant.

SAUDELLI, LUCIA

A concept of freedom in Presocratic philosophy?

To speak of 'freedom' among the pre-Socratics, the thinkers who preceded Socrates and his founding ethics, would be an error of anachronism or, more precisely, prochronism. The earliest Greek philosophers did not raise the issue of 'free will' in human decision-making, nor did they conceive of the ability to 'freely determine' one's actions: this type of thinking undoubtedly came later. In their archaic theories, the Presocratics used concepts such as 'daemon' (δαίμων), a term that refers to the divine part of the individual or the lot destined for an individual; 'intellect' (νοῦς, νόησις), a cosmic causality that governs all things and gives man the ability to direct his actions; 'thought' (γνώμη), understood as both a faculty of the mind, an object of knowledge, and a judgement on what should be done.

It was on the basis of these kinds of notions, both significant and problematic, that the pre-Socratics reflected on the status of the agent, their scope for initiative and their personal responsibility. It is thus possible to identify at least three poles that allow us to sketch out a prehistory of freedom: a literally "demonic" pole, consisting of thinkers such as Heraclitus and Empedocles; a "noetic" pole, so to speak, composed of figures such as Anaxagoras and Diogenes of Apollonia; and a pole that could be described as "gnomic", whose major representative is Democritus. The latter deserves special attention because he seems to have attributed to the wise man a kind of ethical "freedom" that is entirely compatible with the necessity of physical phenomena. In this research, I would like to show the scope but also the limitations of his theory.

ŠĆEPANOVIĆ, SANDRA

Negative Temporal Clauses with the Indicative in Presocratic Fragments

In Melissus' fragments DK30 B2 (D3 LM) and B7.4 (D10 LM), and in Anxagoras' DK59 B6 (D25 LM), we find temporal clauses introduced by ὅτε, which contain verbs in the present indicative negated by μή. In Greek literature, such clauses appear in non-narrative texts, usually dialogues, and have a conditional connotation to them (Kühner/Gerth, *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache* ii, 445–47; Smyth, Greek Grammar §2397; Jiménez López, *Sintaxis del griego antiguo* ii, 749). The hypothetical nature of these clauses sets them clearly apart from the similar temporal clauses in which the present indicative is negated by οὐ and which are to be understood causally (*Cambridge Grammar of Classical Greek*, 547). When the temporal conjunction ὅτε (or ὁπότε) is followed by a verb in the present indicative negated by οὐ, it introduces a statement of fact and is to be rendered by "since"; when it is followed by the present indicative negated by μή, it introduces a neutral conditional and is to be translated by "if".

This distinction is especially important in philosophical discussions (e.g. Pl. *Rep*. 354c). However, in modern translations of the fragments of Melissus and Anaxagoras, both kinds of temporal clauses are commonly translated as causal. My presentation aims to analyse the relevant Presocratic fragments, to see how the two types of ὅτε-clauses

fit in the arguments they are parts of. I will pay special attention to the relation of these clauses to other elements of the arguments and to the presence of particles within the clauses themselves, which can help determine the status of the clauses in their respective arguments. I will focus on the examples of ὅτε-clauses with present indicative negated by μή to show why it is misleading to translate them as causal and can yield wrong interpretations.

SCHARLE, MARGARET

Hesiodic Roots of Heraclitus's Fire and Logos

Heraclitus's fragment B90—πυρὸς τε ἀνταμοιβὴ τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἁπάντων ὅκωσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσός—is usually read as a claim about universal material exchange: fire, like gold, functions as a basic currency of becoming. I argue that Heraclitus deliberately refers to Hesiod's exchange of the golden-crowned Pandora for Prometheus' stolen fire. In Hesiod's telling, fire is smuggled to humans as a hidden good, concealed in a fennel stalk, while Zeus retaliates by crafting Pandora as an evil deceptively masked by gold. Despite extensive discussion of Heraclitean fire as a cosmological principle, scholars have not explored Heraclitus's very choice of fire as grounded in this Prometheus–Pandora exchange. I propose that Heraclitus's B90 should be read as examining this mythic transaction that lies at the heart of Hesiod's texts.

This Hesiodic background not only illuminates Heraclitus's focus on fire, but also reframes his account of *logos*. In *Theogony*, Zeus defeats his father's and grandfather's epistemic vulnerability through preemptive digestion: by consuming Metis (πλεῖστα εἰδυῖαν), he converts her plural, potentially deceptive knowledge into his own unified counsel (μητίετα Ζεὺς). *Works and Days* translates this divine strategy into a human one: Pandora is implanted with deceptive *logoi* (αἰμυλίους λόγους), yet Hesiod's first use of the singular *logos* (WD 106–7) reclaims her plural deception as a unified object of rational storage, the source of human wisdom.

Read through this lens, Heraclitean *logos* is neither mere speech nor detached cosmic law. It names the rational form that can be extracted from deceptive speech, just as fire is both dangerous yet beneficial when brought under rational control. Heraclitus's fire should be understood through this mythic tradition he inherits from Hesiod: Heraclitus invites us to consider the exchange of hidden goods and hidden evils that philosophical analysis alone can stabilize as wisdom.

SHAW, MICHAEL M.

Infinite Problems in Anaxagoras

Anaxagoras invokes the ἄπειρον six times in his fragments, three of these in DK 59B1, which Simplicius identifies as the opening lines of his book. Fragments B2, B4b, and B12 add three additional instances of the term to Anaxagoras' extant corpus of approximately one thousand words. With these six uses, Anaxagoras identifies every possible thing within his cosmological system as a whole and individually as ἄπειρον:

all things, air and aither (B1), the surroundings (B2), seeds (B4b), and Mind (B12). In B1, Anaxagoras explicitly applies *ἄπειρον* to πλῆθος (number, quantity, extent) and size, and each of these in respect to both largeness (μεγέθος) and smallness (σμικρότης). The first two instances in B1 emphasize the ἄπειρον with respect to terms he coins: *smallness* (σμικρότητα) and the substantive, *the small* (τὸ σμικρόν). Further, B1's use of "μέγεθος" is the first time this term denotes unlimited extension in space.[1]

This project examines the poetic features of B1, including parataxis and ring composition, to interpret Anaxagoras' original language and the philosophically unique meaning of these terms.[2] Anaxagoras first emphasizes two senses of *ἄπειρα*: "πλῆθος καὶ σμικρότητα." The fragment concludes by describing *ἄπειρα* in the two corresponding senses of "πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει." These paired terms constitute a simple ring composition that shows with poetic balance the ontological similarities between the large and the small in Anaxagoras' thought. I argue that when used in conjunction with *ἄπειρον*, "σμικρότητα" and "μεγέθει" designate originary conceptions of size. As "πλῆθος," they hold the meaning of *in expanse*, closely following Herodotus I.203 and 204. As such, everything extends forever, counterintuitively including the small. With the invention of "largeness" and "smallness," Anaxagoras also first conceives of an ἄπειρον not only infinite to human perspective, but actually infinite in itself.

---

[1] LSJ *S.V.*

[2] Sider, *Anaxagoras* 25-30.

SIDER, DAVID

Parmenides' Proem: Sources, Language, and Purpose

First, the first line of B 1 did not begin the poem; Sextus' ἐναρχόμενος does not mean "at the very beginning," i.e., line 1. Rather, as a brief review of the use of this verb in Sextus' time shows, it more usually means "towards the beginning." There is thus no need to wonder at, decry, or attempt to justify the Proem's supposed abrupt beginning. Sextus' passage, which Simplicius' citations show to be a seamless join of at least three originally separate passages. I shall further argue that his source was Hippias of Elis' Synagoge, the most likely person to have abridged silently, unlike what is found in other ancient collections, and that Hippias included more than Sextus cites.

In the proem's two minor ecphrases, that of the chariot and that of the gates, Parmenides intentionally offers confusions of various sorts between two objects each concerned with homologous parts that move in circular paths, some of which are also homonymous or nearly so; i.e., three words appear in each but with different senses: ἄξων, σύριγξ, and αἰθ-. This prepares Parmenides' auditors for a defense of mortal language, which falls short of the truth, but is still adequate for communication.

The chariot travels west along the ground and arrives at the liminal spot where earth meets sky and, more significantly, night meets day; which is also where he will learn about night and light, the two basic components of the world of seeming. Parmenides' journey is neither a katabasis or a Himmelfarht.

The proem's apparent confusion of tenses provides evidence that the poem was originally designed for oral presentation, an argument that will also support the reading πάντ᾽ ἄστη (B1.3).

SPERZAGNI, NICHOLAS

Connecting cosmos and reproduction according to the Presocratics

What gave rise to the world is a question that, in antiquity, was accompanied by an enquiry, more limited in spatial scope but no less complex, about whence humans come. The *Corpus Hippocraticum* reveals a dense study of embryology, but it was preceded by the reflections of the pre-Socratics on the origin of the cosmos and the reproductive process, which they saw as a correlated issue, with different objects: the cosmological opposition is constituted by father sky and mother earth, while the embryological one by generative principle and mother nourishment. This dualistic philosophical system involves a system of opposites (male-right-hot-dry, female-left-cold-wet) which applies to both the universe and the determination of the sex of the unborn child. Often, among authors like Empedocles and Anaxagoras, the male principle is paired with attributes that are given positive connotations.

This paper will make the connection between cosmology and embryology visible, on the one hand, from the fact that several creators in the cosmogonic tradition of the Archaic and Classical ages shaped the cosmos through their own seed, and, on the other hand, from Empedocles' treatment of the membranes that enclose both the cosmos and the embryo. Moreover, our approach will include a concise analysis of the roots and developments of this comparison: according to Leitao (2020, 15-18), cosmology and embryology do not seem to arise from socio-political debates about gender roles, but rather appear to be the product of internal developments in 5th-century pre-Socratic philosophy, particularly metaphysics. However, in recent years scholars have shown that socio-political themes are by no means foreign to the Presocratics. Along these lines, our paper will also show that their consequences are crucial in the shaping and legitimization of a patriarchal social order through the interpretation of later thinkers, first and foremost Aristotle.

Bibliography

David D. Leitao, *The Pregnant Male as Myth and Metaphor in Classical Greek Literature*, New York, Cambridge University Press 2012.

STAMATIOU, FILIPPOS – RAJCIC, NINA

Aletheia and Algorithms: Parmenides' Lessons for Understanding Generative AI

Parmenides' goddess argues that to attain Aletheia (truth, knowledge, but more generally cognition, communication, and perception) we must focus on what-is and exclude what-is-not from our investigation. Through an interdisciplinary exploration, we aim to apply the lesson from Aletheia and Doxa to guide our thinking about the

technological phenomena of generative artificial intelligence (Gen AI). We discuss how far Gen AI models can be understood as approximations of the limited whole of 'what-is'. We then discuss how the Parmenidean fragments may offer new perspectives on the ascription of intelligence, consciousness, or agency to these models, and whether mortal perception of AI can helpfully inform understanding of what-is. Hence, we draw on the work of Jenny Bryan to explore how interpreting pre-Socratic philosophy may elucidate debates about the relationship between mortal humans and immortal technologies.

STRAUSS CLAY, JENNY

Parmenides' Proem: *Ex oriente lux*

The opening of Parmenides' poem describes a journey of a nameless *kouros* on a horse-drawn chariot, accompanied by the daughters of the Sun, that leads him to a great gate "of the paths of Night and Day". The gate is guarded by the goddess Dike, Justice, whom the Heliades must coax with soft words and persuade to open the gates to allow the chariot to enter. Once there, the youth is welcomed by an anonymous goddess who instructs him about the Way of Truth and the Way of Opinion, Being and Doxa.

The 32-line proem that precedes the goddess' instruction was at times considered mere window dressing, a literary device, before getting to the meat of Parmenides' teaching. Of late, however, not only has the proem received the attention it deserves but it has also become an object of scholarly controversy involving the direction of the journey of Parmenides' *kouros.* Traditionally, its trajectory has been described as moving from darkness to light, from ignorance to enlightenment. Recent discussions, however, have questioned that consensus and argued for a contrary itinerary from light into darkness, a view that has gained a substantial number of adherents.

My paper falls into two parts: first, I take issue with the revisionist argument for a nocturnal voyage, its presumed topography, and a number of its assumptions. I then propose a new argument for the older view of a journey toward the light.

TAGLIALATELA, GIOVANNI

Timon's *Philosophenspott* as a lens on the pre-Socratic philosophers

This article examines Timon's *Silloi* as a paradigmatic example of the timonian 'Philosophenspott', which systematically transforms the comic conventions of the Attic stage into a satirical critique of philosophical schools. Taking Timon's selective characterisation of key pre-Socratic philosophers as a starting point, the article demonstrates how this mockery both reinforces character-based attributions and undermines epistemological claims. Case studies include Thales (fr. 797 SH), Anaxagoras (fr. 798 SH), Heraclitus (fr. 817 SH), Parmenides (fr. 818 SH), Melissus and Zeno of Elea (fr. 819 SH), Democritus (fr. 820 SH), Pythagoras (fr. 831 SH) and Xenophanes (fr. 833 – 834 SH). These 'figures' are treated not primarily as historical individuals, but as satirical focal points around which discourses on cosmology, knowledge and ways of life converge. Methodologically, the essay combines close reading of the surviving fragments

with a genre and intertextual analysis: Timon's onomastic punchlines and adjectival labelling are compared with comic precursors (*onomastì komodein*) and their transposition into a school-critical topic. This demonstrates that the mockery is not merely defamatory, but functions as a heuristic technique that performatively counteracts the self-interpretation of the respective school (e.g. Pythagorean asceticism; Democritian serenity), thereby revealing epistemological reservations of Pyrrhonian origin. The textual coordinates are consistently anchored to the *Supplementum Hellenisticum* passages (see above) to ensure a controlled argumentation despite the fragmentary nature of the tradition. Consequently, 'Timon's Philosophenspott' emerges as a critical metapoetics of the pre-Socratic portrayal of philosophers: it condenses traditional anecdotes and school *clichés* into satirical role models, through which the tensions between the aspirations and habits of the pre-Socratics can be exemplarily discerned. This simultaneously outlines a bridge between comedy and satire, identifying Timon as a pivotal figure within the history of the reception of the pre-Socratics.

THANASSAS, PANAGIOTIS

Heraclitus B 114: A Re-examination

The paper attempts at a re-examination of the argumentative structure of Heraclitus B 114. The fragment famously introduces an analogy between two relations of *ischyrízein* ("strengthening"): the strengthening of rational speech by the *xynon* (the Common), and the strengthening of the polis by its law. Part I of my paper shows that the fragment's initial sentence is not concerned with political theory, but with clarifying the conditions under which speech becomes genuinely "reasonable." The polis serves merely as an illustrative analogue, chosen because the bond between city and law is self-evident, whereas the bond between individual speech and the *xynon* is obscure and in need of elucidation. The quantitative modification "and much more strongly" does not devalue the political term of the analogy but marks the greater effort required for aligning speech with the common logos. Part II turns to the fragment's second sentence, the notoriously difficult claim that all human laws "are nourished" or "are protected" by the One, the Divine. Rather than choosing between the various, divergent semantic fields of *trephesthai*, the analysis shows that both allow for a twofold legitimating function: human laws are simultaneously empowered and restricted by their relation to the divine One. This legitimating relation explains the asymmetry between the two analogical pairs: the political relation is self-evident and already fulfilled in any functioning polis, whereas the epistemic relation remains a task, rarely achieved. I conclude by indicating that B 114 does not entail a political doctrine but a carefully staged clarification of rational speech and its grounding in *logos*. The political appears only as an analogue and is immediately subordinated to the ontological authority of the divine One.

THEODOROUDI, LIA

Don't think of me as a patricide: Plato's *Sophist* as a reinterpretation of Parmenides' *On Nature*

At 241d[1] of Plato's *Sophist*, the Eleatic Visitor, who leads the discussion, decides to examine Parmenides' teaching, in order to prove, against him, "both that *that which is not* somehow is, and then again that *that which is* somehow is not".[2] However, even though he is clearly planning an attack on his teacher's doctrine, the Visitor asks from his interlocutor to not think of him as "some kind of patricide". This ambiguity leaves scholars questioning whether Plato, through the Visitor, really refutes Parmenides.

This paper makes two claims. First, that someone is indeed refuted, but not Parmenides. The one refuted is Parmenides' appearance (*phantasma*), a distorted image of his teaching,[3] which is also called "Parmenides".[4] This synonymy allows the Visitor to proclaim, at 258ce, that he has refuted Parmenides, even though he has not refuted his teacher's doctrine but a misinterpretation of it. My second claim is that this appearance-misinterpretation of Parmenides' doctrine is replaced by a new interpretation of it.

I will argue that the crucial move of the new interpretation is to shift the focus from the *Alētheia* part of the poem to the part of *Doxa,* which is the one actually relevant to the purposes of the dialogue. I will further argue that the terms "what is" and "what is not" in the Visitor's analysis do not correspond to Parmenides' "what is" and "what is not" as they appear in B6, B7 and B8, up to B8.49.[5] Instead, they have more in common with the notions of "light" and "night" in B8.50-61 and B9. The Visitor is concerned with light and night because, as part of human *doxai,* they are helpful in explaining the possibility of falsehood, which is the dialogue's central concern.

TORRENTE, LUCA

The invention of the history of philosophy: Theophrastus, the forgotten founder

Aristotle's first book of *Metaphysics* is traditionally considered to be the first history of philosophy. However, several interpreters have shown that Aristotle did not set out to write a history of philosophy. It is a dialectical study of the *endoxa*, the accepted opinions that Aristotle adopts as the starting point for his own theorizing. Such an exposition belongs to the early history of doxography. The same dialectical approach can be found in other works by Aristotle and also in Theophrastus (for example, in *De sensibus*, where Theophrastus presents and then criticizes the opinions of his predecessors on sensation). H. Baltussen rightly called "critical endoxography" the examination of previous opinions to assess whether they have anything worth preserving. It can therefore be noted that the works mentioned do not correspond to what is known as the "history of philosophy".

However, there is a (lost) work by Theophrastus, known only in fragments, which in many respects can be considered the first history of philosophy*: The Opinions of Natural Philosophers* (*Physicorum opiniones* / Φυσικῶν δόξαι). In my paper, I will discuss the issues related to the title of the work, and I will show that the treatise Φυσικῶν

δόξαι is not a simple doxography (as in the case of Aetius) and does not take a purely dialectical approach (as in the cases of Aristotle or Theophrastus' *De sensibus*). In this work, Theophrastus, on the contrary, specifies (A) the spatio-temporal framework of the philosophers mentioned; (B) their reciprocal master-disciple relationships; and (C) the influences exerted by the thinking of one on that of another. Theophrastus thus invented a new literary genre: the history of philosophy.

TORRIJOS-CASTRILLEJO, DAVID

Mythology and Anaxagoras' σπέρματα

Most scholars have regarded Anaxagoras' σπέρματα as being exclusively connected with living beings (Ritter, Cornford, Schofield, Curd, Therme, among others). In keeping with this line of interpretation, Stokes considered them to be the starting points of growth of living things. While this interpretation is certainly plausible, it may be sufficient to understand the σπέρματα as a way of referring to the χρήματα insofar as they are present in small quantities within the primordial mixture.

In our presentation, however, we wish to emphasize the possible dependence of Anaxagoras' text on various literary sources that articulate a mythology of fertility with cosmic implications. In the poets we encounter the notion of the sky's fertility over the earth, associated with air and water—elements that, in Anaxagoras' system, serve as the vehicle for the σπέρματα, while σπέρματα account for the origin of things on earth. Comparable parallels appear among other Presocratics as well, such as in the testimonies concerning Pythagorean philosophy, where the metaphor of σπέρμα is employed to explain a germinal origin of the cosmos. In particular, the notion of σπέρματα may offer a way of linking Anaxagoras with the Orphic tradition, even though his relationship to Orphism remains largely understudied.

TROVATO, LUIGI

Two forgotten testimonies on the Anaxagorean *Noûs*: Damascius (*In Prm*. I, 15.1-6 [Combès-Westerink]) and Proclus (*In Prm*. VII, 1214.8-9 [Cousin])

At the beginning of his *Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*, in a rather fragmentary section of the text (*In Prm.* I, 15.1-6, ed. Combès-Westerink 2002[2] [prem. éd. 1997]), Damascius states that Proclus assumes that the Anaxagorean *noûs* is the soul (αὐτὸς ψυχὴν ἀξιοῖ ὑποτίθεσθαι τὸν Ἀναξαγόρειον νοῦν). Unfortunately, the corresponding section of Proclus' own *Commentary on Plato's Parmenides* is missing and the mention of Anaxagoras in *In Prm.* VII, 1214.8-9 (Cousin) is misleading, since in that context Proclus is speaking of the first principle, which is not the incorporeal soul, as Anaxagoras said (οὔτε ψυχὴν ἀσώματον, ὡς Ἀναξαγόρας ἔλεγεν).

Morever, as Combès points out in his note *ad loc.* to Damascius (note 3, p. 119), these two passages of both Proclus and Damascius are not collected in the Diels-Kranz collection and, apparently, neither in the Laks-Most collection.

So, the purpose of this paper is to esamine these two testimonies concerning

Anaxagoras, with particular focus on the one provided by Damascius, and to clarify how and why Damascius can claim that the Anaxagorean *noûs* is not the intellect but rather the soul. A further aim is to assess whether they should be included among the other testimonies concerning the Presocratic Philosopher or regarded instead as later Neoplatonic interpretations of the Anaxagorean *noûs*.

VALENTINO, GIULIA

The transmigration of the soul from Presocratic doctrines to the *Orphic Rhapsodies*

The Orphic *Rhapsodies*, composed probably in the first century BCE, offer a privileged vantage point for observing the persistence and transformation of Presocratic doctrines concerning the soul, the divine, and the structure of the cosmos. Far from being a mere repository of archaic traditions, the poem emerges as a retroactive construct shaped by complex stratification: it reworks earlier Orphic materials, integrates Hellenistic developments, and—above all—engages with conceptual models attributed to the Presocratics, reframing them as elements of a theological myth attributed to Orpheus.

This paper focuses on the Rhapsodic fragments devoted to the transmigration of the soul (OF 337–340 Bernabé), comparing them with Presocratic evidence to show how the Rhapsodic author appropriates earlier philosophical doctrines.

These fragments resonate with Empedocles DK 31 B 2 (on the multiplicity of living forms) and with the motif of mortal ignorance, comparable to Parmenides DK 28 B 6. In OF 338, the description of the soul changing form through a cycle of animal lives directly parallels the Empedoclean doctrine of the wandering *daímōn* (DK 31 B 115; B 117; B 126), while formal echoes recall Empedocles DK 31 B 137.

The distinction between animal and human souls and Hermes' psychopompic role in OF 339 further engage with Diogenes of Apollonia DK 64 B 4–5, for whom the soul is intelligent air permeating the living being. Particularly important is the theory of the soul as *aēr*: attributed by Aristotle to the Orphics and elsewhere to the Pythagoreans, and philosophically developed by Diogenes, it is reconfigured in the *Rhapsodies*, where it applies to animal souls but is denied for human ones, introducing a doctrinal tension absent from earlier formulations.

Taken together, these convergences allow us to read the *Rhapsodies* as a hermeneutical crossroads: they do not attest an Orphic influence on the Presocratics, but rather the opposite movement—the absorption and reinterpretation of Presocratic themes within a late antique Orphic framework, in which metempsychosis becomes a cosmological principle, an ethical norm, and an initiatory path toward liberation.

VALENTINOVÁ, LUCIE

Minoan Visual Culture and the Image of Okeanos

Homeric cosmology is often considered a precursor of Presocratic thought. Yet it presents a paradox: it describes the earth simultaneously as having limits, *peirata,* and being limitless, *apeiron*. Gregory suggests that this apparent contradiction is resolved through lived experience, attributing to Homer the "emotional perspective of a traveler" – the world seems boundless despite having an edge (Gregory 2016: 86). Similarly, Kahn interprets Homeric *apeiron* not as literal infinity but as "what cannot be passed over or traversed from end to end" (Kahn 1960: 232), emphasizing a subjective sense of endless expanse. In the *Iliad*, this paradox is represented in the ekphrastic description of Okeanos as a bounding yet unapproachable horizon on the Shield of Achilleus (*Il.* XVIII.478-608).

Although the origins of Homeric cosmological imagery remain uncertain and scholars commonly suggest Near Eastern influences, this paper turns attention to Minoan visual culture. It explores the possibility that the image of Okeanos inherits and transforms Minoan modes of visual–spatial perception – represented in topographical miniature frescoes – which does not presuppose a fixed point of view. Following Nagy's account of epic as a product of centuries of oral recomposition in performance, it argues that the ongoing collection, adoption, and reworking of epic material allowed Minoan visual heritage to permeate the Greek cultural substrate. It suggests that Homeric cosmology preserves traces of a Minoan worldview above all through its spatial organization rather than in explicit genealogical or cosmogonic narratives. The paper further proposes a connection to Minoan spiral motifs – ornamental patterns often visually linked to shields and contextually associated with water. Finally, it points to Pherecydes' strong visual emphasis in his description of Okeanos (Ogenos) as "embroidered" (*poikillei*), read in light of Homer's use of the same verb for the Knossian scene depicted on the Shield of Achilleus in close proximity to Okeanos.

VERGOULI, VASIA

How and why Plato and Aristotle see teleology where the Presocratics might not?

The proposed paper examines how Plato and Aristotle construct the Presocratics as bearers of 'traces' of teleology, and how these traces are identified, amplified, or reshaped in light of each thinker's own teleological commitments. Recent work has highlighted a variety of teleological strands among the Presocratics; the paper approaches them from a different angle, namely by asking how Plato and Aristotle appropriate these strands in constructing their intellectual genealogies. Rather than assessing whether early thinkers "really were" teleologists, the paper focuses on the *reception* of these teleological tendencies and on the methodological assumptions that govern Plato's and Aristotle's divergent readings.

To this end, I clarify a small set of working distinctions -between global and local teleology, purposive and impersonal teleology, and value-laden vs merely structural

order-by analysing a cluster of *shared Greek terms* (*nous*, *kosmos*, *taxis*, *beltiston*, *to hou heneka*). Some of these terms already appear in Presocratic texts and are subsequently developed by Plato and Aristotle. On this basis, I revisit a group of Presocratic figures often cited as teleological or quasi-teleological, above all Anaxagoras, but also Xenophanes, Heraclitus, Diogenes of Apollonia, Empedocles, and the Derveni author. Drawing on recent scholarship on Presocratic teleology, I show how specific expressions of order, rule, intelligence and 'what is best' in these texts furnish later authors with the materials for teleological interpretation, without themselves constituting full-blown teleological systems.

The core of the paper is a comparative account of Plato's and Aristotle's reception of this material. The result is a more nuanced understanding of the ancient history of teleology, in which the Presocratics emerge not simply as failed or incomplete teleologists, but as a complex field through which Plato and Aristotle articulate and legitimise their own teleological programs.

WANG, YU

Archelaus on Two Stages of Human Origin and Moral Conventionalism

This paper advances the thesis that Archelaus of Athens formulates the earliest integrated theory linking cosmology, anthropology, and moral conventionalism, thereby serving as a crucial bridge between Presocratic naturalism and the ethical orientation of classical philosophy. Betegh (2016) convincingly shows that Archelaus was a precursor of such a unified theoretical framework and had already exerted significant influence among his contemporaries. However, he does not explain how the unification of cosmology and moral conventionalism is possible. This paper addresses that gap by proposing, through an analysis of the two stages of human origin, a possible model of integration.

Archelaus begins with hot and cold as basic forces setting the cosmos in motion. Through rarefaction and condensation, these forces generate the separation of earth and heaven, the emergence of celestial bodies, and the ordering of the world. From this cosmology Archelaus derives a continuous account of animal and human origins. When the earth was first warmed in the region where the hot and cold were mixing, both animals and human beings arose. At this initial stage, all living beings shared the same regimen, being nourished by mud (*Hipp. Haer*. 1.9.5 = 60A4 DK). I call this the natural stage of human origin: lifestyle practices are undifferentiated and therefore devoid of normative content. This stage, however, is brief. It is followed by a second, artificial stage, marked by genealogical proliferation—"one generation begets another" (ibid.)—from which leaders, laws, and cities emerge.

Against this developmental background, Archelaus' well-known claim that justice is by convention, not by nature (*D.L.* 2.16 = 60A1 DK), can be understood as follows: nature can grant only a homogeneous mode of life to human beings and animals alike. In such a condition, there is no space for law or justice, for these normative contents arise only once distinctions emerge—between humans and animals, and among human beings themselves—through genealogical proliferation. Consequently, they are not

"natural" in an egalitarian or universal sense, but rather particular (to different genealogy and accordingly different tribes) and therefore conventional.

WROTKOWSKI, WOJCIECH

On the Value of Reading Heraclitus in the Primary Sources Preserving His Fragments (B98, B67, B53)

The scholarly benefits of consulting the words of the Ephesian within their full context — that is, within the works of the authors who transmit them — are manifold and, indeed, indispensable for any researcher of ancient philosophy. The context in which a fragment of Heraclitus appears in an ancient source typically illuminates both the intentions of the citing author and the manner in which the fragment was understood (see, e.g., B98; cf. Plutarch, *De facie in orbe lunae* 943E3–4). Such considerations must be rigorously observed when examining the thought of the pre-Socratics, in order to evaluate the extent to which the meaning of a given quotation in one source corresponds to: (a) other sources in which it has been cited or paraphrased by different authors (see, e.g., B51; cf. Hippolytus, *Refutatio omnium haeresium* IX 9,2; Plato, *Symposium* 187a3–6); (b) other sayings of the Ephesian that may elucidate the interpretation of his words as transmitted in a particular source (see, e.g., B53; cf. B67); and (c) subsequent translations — particularly modern ones — many of which have been produced independently of their textual context, contrary to the methodological injunctions of Cherniss ("In considering any so-called fragment […] it is necessary not to be content to read it in isolation") and Cleve ("[…] we should always check and double-check all these quotations with the places of their origin").

A meticulous examination of Heraclitus' aphorisms within the primary sources enables verification of the information and citations presented in the critical apparatus of the Diels–Kranz (DK) collection. For instance, the passage concerning the Sethians in Book V of Hippolytus' *Refutatio* (V,21,2–4) does not clarify the meaning of Heraclitus' aphorism B67 — cited by Hippolytus in Book IX (IX,10,8,5–8) — but rather obscures it. This excerpt was included in the DK collection to support not only the conjecture ⟨πῦρ⟩, but also an otherwise erroneous translation ("[…] nach dem Duft […]").

Any reliable reconstruction and presentation of Heraclitus' thought must be grounded in scrupulously verified primary sources, rather than in selectively extracted quotations or, still less, in translations detached from their original context. For example, the well-known maxim B53 conveys a substantially different meaning in Hippolytus' own text (*Refutatio* IX,9,4–5: … ὅτι δέ ἐστιν ὁ πατὴρ…), that is, in the primary source, than it does in the majority of modern studies and anthologies, which typically rely on the DK collection. How, then, may one account for this evident discrepancy, and what measures should be taken to prevent its perpetuation and further dissemination? Scholars must exercise the intellectual courage to return to the primary sources themselves and to engage with them rigorously. The reward is a closer approximation to the truth, a clear scholarly conscience, and genuine originality in research.

ZAMORA CALVO, JOSÉ MARÍA

Ἀυγὴ ξηρά / *Lux sicca*. Porfirio, intérprete de Heráclito

En *El antro de las ninfas* (11, p. 126, 184-185 Dorandi) Porfirio hace uso de la oposición húmedo-seco, citando a Heráclito –"el alma seca es la más sabia (ξηρὰ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη)" (fr. 22 B 118 DK = 68b[2] Marcovich)–, para explicar la condición del alma, que puede liberarse del vínculo con la corporeidad, como sucede con el alma del sabio, o volver por efecto del deseo a la mezcla con la materia. El estado del hálito (πνεῦμα) refleja la condición moral del alma, su vinculación o desvinculación del cuerpo. Nos proponemos analizar la expresión tradicional atribuida a Héraclito para definir el alma, cuya formulación completa sería: αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη (B 118, vol. 1, p. 177, 4-5 DK). Aunque, desde el siglo XVI, el texto original debería incluir αὖη, término raro que significa "seca", por lo que ξηρὴ sería una glosa añadida al texto (Marcovich, *Heraclitus*, ed. maior, pp. 377-378). En la *Sentencia* 29, 41-43, Porfirio cita, de manera más precisa, el mismo texto que en *De antro*, 11. Resulta fascinante explorar cómo el fragmento heraclíteo es citado, a partir de Porfirio, conectándolo con el *Fedro* (229a), por neoplatónicos posteriores, como Sinesio (*Somn*. 7, 25-28 Terzaghi), para quien la imagen platónica del plumaje del alma indica que el ascenso del hálito depende del calor y la sequedad, o Hermias (*In Phaedr*. 29, 28-29 Lucarini-Moreschini), para quien el alma del iniciado es un alma ardiente, necesitada de beber de la fuente del conocimiento